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The Reality of EU-Conformity Review in France
Juscelino F. Colares

∗

"Il ne peut y avoir égalité devant la loi, s'il n'y a pas unité de la loi."1
"The operation of a double system of conflicting laws in the
same State is plainly hostile to the reign of law."2

French High Courts embraced review of national legislation for conformity with EU law in
different stages and following distinct approaches to EU law supremacy. This article tests
whether adherence to different views on EU law supremacy has resulted in different levels
of EU directive enforcement by the French High Courts. After introducing the complex
French systems of statutory, treaty and constitutional review, this study explains how EUconformity review emerged among these systems and provides an empirical analysis
refuting the anecdotal view that different EU supremacy theories produce substantial
differences in conformity adjudication outcomes. These Courts' uniformly high rates of EU
directive enforcement and similar willingness to refer questions to the ECJ for preliminary
rulings demonstrate that, despite adopting dissimilar approaches to the supremacy of
Communitarian law, French judges have flourished as Communitarian law judges. The
article concludes by presenting an explanation for this high degree of convergence: French
judges, responding to growing European integration and enabled by a changing
constitutional landscape, adjusted their views to ensure they would have a role in molding
the integration of national and EU law. (JEL: F 53, K 33, K 41)

Introduction†
Besides establishing the free flow of capital, workers, goods and services among the
national states forming the nascent European Union,3 Europe's Founding Fathers4 aimed to
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1

Jean-Marc Sauvé, Vingt ans après . . . l'arrêt Nicolo, in 40.1 GAZETTE DU PALAIS 5-10, at 9
(2009). The Honorable Jean-Marc Sauvé is the Chief-Justice (Vice-président) of the Council of
State.
2

Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 112 (1945) (Felix Frankfurter, J. (speaking for the
majority)).
3

The EU is the supranational governmental organization, formed currently by 27 European
national states, of which France, along with Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Belgium and
Luxembourg, is a founding member. Originally formed under the Treaty of Rome (1957) (also
referred to as the "Treaty Establishing the European Community" since 1993) and named as the
European Economic Community ("EEC"), it owes its current name to the Treaty on European
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create a new legal order, premised on the respect for economic, civil and political rights
administered by a new justice system: a post-national, European one. Of course, the new
legal order could only come into existence if individuals—European citizens—were
governed by the same law wherever they lived, worked or travelled within the bounds of a
new European space no longer dominated by national borders.5 To promote uniform
interpretation of this new body of laws, the Treaty of Rome created the Court of Justice of
the European Communities (the "European Court of Justice" or "ECJ"), the successor to the
commercially-focused Court of Justice of the European Coal and Steel Community in
operation since 1951.6
The ECJ has a broad and varied original jurisdiction. Not only can it entertain
challenges to the legality of acts by EU institutions (art. 230), it has jurisdiction over
actions by the EU Commission against member states for failure to fulfill their obligations
under the Treaty of Rome (art. 226), and it can review challenges to national institutions'
failures to adhere to the terms of the Treaty of Rome (recours en carence) (art. 232) (on
grounds such as misuse of power, failure of observing due process, failure to act, etc.).
Furthermore, the ECJ is competent to give "preliminary rulings" on questions (questions
Union ("TEU" or the "Maastricht Treaty"), signed on February 2, 1992. Treaty on European
Union and Final Act. Feb.7, 1992, 31 I.L.M. 247.
4

The men commonly identified as the European Founding Fathers, largely due to their efforts
toward early European construction, are Konrad Adenauer, Alcide De Gasperi and Robert
Schuman.
5

La Cour de cassation et la construction juridique Européenne—L'office du juge, in C. CASS.
RAPPORT ANNUEL (2006) 93, 97.
6

See Treaty Establishing the European Community, Nov. 10, 1997, 1997 O.J. (C 340) 3
("Treaty of Rome"). The other major supranational European Court, the European Court of
Human Rights ("ECHR") was created one year earlier under the auspices of the European
Convention of Human Rights. European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms, Nov. 14, 1950 (the "European Convention of Human Rights" or the
"Convention"). Because the Convention includes 20 European states outside the 27 EU members
and this study focuses solely on conflicts between French national law and EU law, ECHRrelated developments will only be discussed when absolutely necessary. Yet, the traditional
separation between EU law and the Convention regime deserves some revision in light of the
December 1, 2009 entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon, which amended the Maastricht Treaty
by, among other things, referring expressly to the European Charter of Fundamental Rights (the
"Charter"), making it legally binding on all EU members. See Treaty of Lisbon Amending the
Treaty on European Union and the Treaty Establishing the European Community, Dec. 13, 2007,
2007 O.J. (C 306) 50 ("Treaty of Lisbon"). Because the Charter expressly proscribes EU
regulations and directives from contradicting the Convention (the UK and Poland have opted out,
however), it is also binding on EU members when they are implementing EU law. See Charter of
Fundamental Rights of the European Union, Dec. 14, 2007, 2007 O.J. (C 303) 15. This means
that the two regimes have now converged into one, with the caveat that the Convention now has
binding effect on European supranational and national actors as a matter of EU law. Because the
Convention also has binding effect on all 27 EU members as a matter of their own foreign
relations law due to their status as signatories, this convergence sets up interesting jurisdictional
conflicts as national courts face the possibility of having to choose between potentially different
interpretations of human rights law between the ECJ and ECHR.
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préjudicielles) regarding EU law referred to it by national courts or tribunals (art. 234).7
Specifically, article 234 grants national judges the discretion (lower-level national courts)
or obligation (national courts of last resort) to refer any nontrivial EU law question
necessary to the disposition of a case to the ECJ.
As vast as the ECJ's original jurisdiction is, about half of its caseload is derived
from its connections with national courts,8 whether through referrals of preliminary
questions by national courts or challenges to the conformity of decisions by the latter with
Communitarian (i.e., European Union) law and precedents.9 Yet, these few treatysanctioned linkages between the ECJ and national judges illustrate only superficially the
very important role national judges have played in construing and developing
Communitarian law. Despite the lack of a specific grant of authority in the major European
treaties, national judges have uniformly interpreted the power of referral to include an
implicit authorization to act as ordinary judges of Communitarian law.10 Acting to ensure
uniformity in the application of EU law, national judges and courts have the power to set
aside domestic law in favor of Communitarian law in disputes before them.11
This article offers the first systematic study of how the French High Courts—
judicial (Cour de cassation (Cassation)), administrative (Conseil d'État (Council of State))
and constitutional (Conseil constitutionnel (Constitutional Council or the Council))—have
decided disputes regarding the conformity of French national laws to European Union
("EU") directives. Under article 249 of the Treaty of Rome, member states are required to
implement all EU directives by enacting a new statute (i.e., a law of transposition) or by
utilizing any other "form or method" of regulation that produces the results intended in the
directives. Because the scope of a given national law or regulation may at times intersect
with that of a directive, irrespective of whether such norm is specifically intended to
transpose a directive, this study investigates not only challenges to the conformity of

7

Two additional supranational judicial institutions have been created to assist the ECJ in its
multiple tasks and thus operate under its supervision: the Court of First Instance (1988) and the
Civil Service Tribunal (2004).
8

See COURT OF JUSTICE OF THE EUROPEAN UNION, ANNUAL REPORT (2008) 82 (reporting
288 referrals of preliminary questions and 210 direct actions (some of which are actions for
failure to fulfill obligations by national governments) out of a total of 592 new cases filed in the
ECJ that year).
9

Following standard parlance, this article uses the terms "EU law" and "Communitarian law"
interchangeably.
10

See, e.g., Jean-Guy Huglo, La mission spécifique d'une Cour suprême dans l'application du
droit communautaire: l'exemple de la Cour de cassation française, in 26 GAZETTE DU PALAIS
1972 (2000) (describing Cassation's role in the application of EU law in France as deriving from
its power of referral) (The Honorable Jean-Guy Huglo is a Conseiller réferendaire at the Court of
Cassation).
11

See, e.g., Guy Canivet, Avant-Propos, in 26 GAZETTE DU PALAIS 1971 (2000) (The
Honorable Guy Canivet, writing then as Chief-Justice (Premier président) of the Court of
Cassation, is currently an Associate-Justice (Membre) of the Constitutional Council); and Sauvé,
supra note 1at 9.
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national laws of transposition to directives but also broader conflicts between national
measures (including regulations and administrative acts) and directives.
Thus, this study analyzes the extent to which the French High Courts have applied
domestic law in contemplation of European directives. In doing so, this article expands on
the existing literature in two key ways. First, it attempts to verify empirically whether there
are any discernable differences among these Courts in how they have decided disputes
involving conflicts between French law and EU directives (i.e., regardless whether a
transposing law is involved). It analyzes the High Courts' decisions from 1989 to 2008 to
determine whether national adjudicators have taken a pro-Europe or Euroskeptic stance
based on how deferential each Court has been to EU directives in these conflict cases. The
study tests whether any observable difference emerges in the patterns of decisions adopted
by these Courts. Second, after detecting a tendency towards convergence in their
deferential treatment of EU law and ECJ precedent, the article presents an overarching
rationale for the growing degree of convergence, one largely based on shifting perceptions
of Europe and its institutions, fostered by continuous constitutional reforms, judicial
adaptation and growing European judicial comity.
Part I of this article briefly reviews the legal and political science literature on the
relationship between national and supranational courts on both sides of the Atlantic and
ponders whether a focus on supranational courts can accurately reveal the truly
multidimensional nature of European judicial integration. After making the case that it
cannot, the article discusses more recent French scholarship on the subject and illustrates
its richness by focusing on the role played by the ensemble of the French judiciary.
In light of (a) this study's inquiry on French national courts' role as European
adjudicators and (b) the uniqueness of the French judicial system, Part II provides a primer
on its basic characteristics. The uniqueness of the French judicial system, it will be
demonstrated, owes much to France's historic attachment to legislative sovereignty (or the
theory of the loi-écran, as it is known in France), namely the political-legal doctrine under
which promulgated statutes (until quite recently) could not be challenged before any court.
Part II shows that this limitation on the jurisdiction of French courts is one of the major
reasons for the development of a dual system of review: where a priori constitutional
review12 operates on parallel with ex post conformity review, the latter of which is the
focus of this article.13 Part II identifies and explains these review systems as responses to
12

By a priori constitutional review, I refer to the-until-recently sole method of constitutional
review in France: abstract review. This method of review remains restricted to certain political
actors who have standing to file constitutionally-based challenges against approved but yet-to-be
promulgated bills, thus forming a case that is heard exclusively by the Constitutional Council.
See 1958 CONST., art. 61-1. I will discuss the implications of the recent introduction of ex post
constitutional review later in this article.
13

By ex post conformity review, I refer solely to court challenges to the conformity of
promulgated national law (hence ex post) and other government acts with respect to France's
international engagements. As will be shown, this form of review, though not expressly
authorized in the Constitution, has been interpreted by the French High Courts to be essential for
the effective enforcement of article 55 of their Constitution. However, as stated in note 6, this
article focuses only on the subset of conformity review litigation that involves challenges to
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historic-legal constraints that have deeply affected the manner in which both the Council
itself and the other High Courts conduct all review in France, thus having a direct impact
on how French adjudicators apply EU law.
Following Part II's discussion of the Constitutional Council's development of a
dichotomous review system, Part III turns to both Cassation's14 and Council of State's15
initial deployment of conformity review in the Vabre (1975) and Nicolo (1989) decisions.
These were the pivotal moments where these Courts, after an invitation by the
Constitutional Council, "found" an implicit authorization under the Constitution to review
the conformity of a French statute with respect to the Treaty of Rome, thus deploying
conformity review in France. Part IV provides a methodology for the development of the
study's database. Part V offers a quantitative analysis that shows a high degree of
convergence among the High Courts in their treatment of national law/EU directive
conflicts, a convergence that reveals a high degree of deference to EU directives. The
implications of a strong convergence and alignment among these courts with respect to
European supranational jurisprudence are also examined.
This article concludes by suggesting that the Constitutional Reform of 2008,16
which expanded the Constitutional Council's jurisdiction to ex post, concrete (i.e., "asapplied") constitutional review, introduces a number of challenging questions that will
occupy the minds of French High Court Justices for years to come. As a newer system of
constitutional review begins operating side-by-side with a largely overlapping EU law
conformity review system, which increases the likelihood of jurisdictional disputes, the
relationship among French Justices and their relationship with the ECJ are likely to face
new pressures.
I.

Prior Literature on European Judicial Integration

Despite significant scholarly interest in the United States and Great Britain on
European integration, American17 and British comparativists and political scientists tend to
existing national laws vis-à-vis EU law. Thus, conflicts between French law and other European
law (e.g., the Convention) or international law are outside the scope of this article.
14

Administration des Douanes v. Société des Cafés Jacques Vabre & J. Weigel et Cie. SARL,
[1975] 2 CMLR 336 (Cass., Ch. mix. 6, May 24, 1975) (Court of Cassation, Combined
Chambers) (Invalidating an internal consumption tax established by the French Customs Code
due to its incompatibility with certain provisions of the Treaty of Rome and holding that
Communitarian law, by virtue of article 55 of the Constitution, constitutes "a separate legal order
integrated with that of the Member states . . . and is binding on their courts.").
15

Raoul Georges Nicolo and Another, [1990]1 CMLR 173 (Conseil d'Etat, Ass., October 20,
1989) (Council of State, Assembly) (holding that a national law providing rules for the election of
representatives to the Assembly of the European Communities was not in conflict with certain
provisions of the Treaty of Rome, after finding that article 55 of the Constitution implicitly
authorized the Court to engage in conformity review).
16

This Reform was approved by the French Parliament on July 21, 2008. See Constitutional
Law no. 2008-724 of July 23, 2008 on Modernizing the Institutions of the Fifth Republic, n.1.
17

I use the term "American" to refer to ideas, people and things emanating from the United
States. That is the case even when they did not come originally from the United States.
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examine the relationship between national law and EU law from a supranational
perspective, often subsuming discussions of national courts' decisions under analyses of
European Court of Justice ("ECJ") decisions.18 This supranational focus is influenced by
the tremendous growth of EU judicial and non-judicial institutions and the particular path
of constitutionalization they pursued—a path paved largely by supranational judicial
lawmaking and technocrat-driven incremental treaty-making.19
At first look, it seems reasonable that, as a substantial portion of law-creation
moves away from individual states to the purview of supranational institutions and actors,
legal analysis should shift away from a purely state-centric approach. This shift, however,
does not require that all analysis of European integration occur only at high levels of
aggregation. That would risk ignoring the very rich and illuminating contribution that
diverse state-based legal institutions have given to this process. A "bottom-up" study of
this integration process that takes the French High Courts as a point of departure would
explain how gradually, over the last fifty-years, these institutions distanced themselves
from purely state-centric perspectives to embrace the underlying values inspiring the
creation of the EU.20 Thus, top-bottom, supremacy-infused analyses of EU law and
18

See, e.g., JOSEPH H. WEILER & MARLENE WIND, EUROPEAN CONSTITUTIONALISM
BEYOND THE STATE (2003); Joseph H. Weiler, The Transformation of Europe, 100 YALE L.J.
2403-83 (1991) (both proposing that Europe's constitutional order has emerged from ECJ
jurisprudence); and MICHELLE EVERSON AND JULIA EISNER, THE MAKING OF A EUROPEAN
CONSTITUTION: JUDGES AND LAW BEYOND CONSTITUTIVE POWER (2007) (articulating the view
that ECJ jurisprudence has driven EU's constitutionalization process, one that dispenses with the
need for a conventional constituent forms of constitutional drafting). For illuminating
comparative work that incorporates both national and supranational judicial perspectives, see
MITCHEL DE S. -O. -L'E. LASSER, JUDICIAL DELIBERATIONS–A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF
JUDICIAL TRANSPARENCY AND LEGITIMACY (2004); and ALEC STONE SWEET, GOVERNING WITH
JUDGES–CONSTITUTIONAL POLITICS IN EUROPE (2000). Similar high levels of aggregation also
predominate in current U.S.-based research on European human rights law. Compare YONATAN
LUPU & ERIK VOETEN, THE ROLE OF PRECEDENT AT THE EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS:
A NETWORK ANALYSIS OF CASE CITATIONS(2010) (concluding that the ECHR uses case law to
both justify its decisions and develop legal norms), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1549947,
with their French counterparts, Michel Troper & Christophe Grzegorczyk, Precedent in France,
in D. Neil MacCormick and Robert S. Summers, eds., INTERPRETING PRECEDENTS: A
COMPARATIVE STUDY (Ashgate Publishing 1997) (explaining why French courts are less inclined
to justify their decisions on precedent than courts in common law countries).
19

See Grainne de Búrca, The Drafting of a Constitution for the European Union: Europe's
Madisonian Moment or a Moment of Madness?, 61 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 555-83, 556-58. For a
critique of judicial constitutionalization, see Martin M. Shapiro, Comparative Law and
Comparative Politics, 53 S. CAL. L. REV. 537-42 (1980).
20

Indeed, other "bottom-up" international law scholars have observed that transnational legal
orders rely heavily on collaboration among cross-border domestic judicial, administrative and
legislative networks as well as nonstate actors. See, e.g., ANNE-MARIE SLAUGHTER, A NEW
WORLD ORDER (Princeton University Press) (2004) (discussing the concept of the disaggregated
state) and Kenneth W. Abbott, Strengthening International Regulation Through Transnational
New Governance, 42 VANDERBILT J. TRANSNAT'L L. 501 (Summer 2009) (arguing that diverse
combinations of nonstate and state actors often cooperate and, in some instances, even create
innovative institutions to apply transnational norms to business).

-6-

PLEASE DO NOT QUOTE OR CITE WITHOUT AUTHOR'S PERMISSION

DRAFT OF AUG. 29, 2011 (SC)

institutions ought to be complemented by analyses that account for the dynamic and
complex relationships among national and supranational adjudicators.
Unlike their U.S. counterparts, most French commentators (i.e., law professors and
academically-inclined lawyers) adopt the latter approach. They typically focus on rulings
by national courts and analyze the evolving status of European law in France, while adding
commentary on ECJ jurisprudence.21 This scholarship is highly valuable due to its
enlightening discussion of questions regarding domestic implementation of EU directives
in full view of supranational processes, but, unfortunately, tends to be available only in
French.22 Although these studies benefit from approaching EU law from both national and
supranational perspectives, they often overemphasize punctual friction points (i.e.,
exceptional cases) between the French High Courts and the ECJ and, therefore, fail to give
due credit to the high level of inter-institutional mutual cooperation in the vast majority of
their important decisions.23
Remarkably, a number of judge-written articles have appeared throughout the last
decade to explain how French judges view the role of EU law.24 These articles might
arguably be considered an attempt to offset French scholars' tendency to focus on
exceptional decisions and occasional friction by depicting the relationship between judges
and EU law and institutions as a far more cooperative venture. Regardless, to effectively
21

See, e.g., Anne Levade, La constitutionnalité des lois de transposition entre conformité et
compatibilité, 1291-1306 MÉLANGES EN L'HONNEUR DE LOUIS FAVOREAU (Dalloz 2007);
Bertran Mathieu, Le contrôle des lois de transposition des directives communautaires par le
Conseil constitutionnel ou les difficulties du cartésianisme, 1307-16 MÉLANGES EN L'HONNEUR
DE LOUIS FAVOREAU (Dalloz 2007); Florence Chaltiel, Droit constitutionnel et droit
communautaire–Nouvelle precision sur les rapports entre le droit constitutionnel et le droit
communautaire–La decision du Conseil constitutionnel du 27 juillet 2006 sur la loi relative aux
droit d'auteurs, 68 REVUE FRANÇAISE DE DROIT CONSTITUTIONNEL, 837-47 (2006); Bruno
Genevois, Le Conseil constitutionnel et le droit communautaire dérivé–A propos de la decision nº
2004-496 DC du 10 juin 2004, REVUE FRANÇAISE DE DROIT ADMINISTRATIF, 651-61 (JulyAugust 2004); and Jacques Arrighi de Casanova, La decision nº 2004-496 DC du 10 juin 2004 et
la hiérarchie des normes, ACTUALITÉ JURIDIQUE – DROIT ADMINISTRATIF, 1534-37 (July 26,
2004).
22

But see Marie-Claire Ponthoreau and Frabrice Hourquebie, The French 'Conseil
Constitutionnel': An Evolving Form of Constitutional Justice, 3.2 THE JOURNAL OF
COMPARATIVE LAW 269 (2008), and Xavier Groussot, EU Law Principles in French Public Law:
'Un Accueil Réservé,' 0 REVIEW OF EUROPEAN ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 9 (2007).
23

See note 21.

24

See, e.g., Jacques Biancarelli et al., Peut-on parler d'un "renouveau européen" du Conseil
d'Etat depuis 2007, 1-16 (forthcoming in MÉLANGES EN L'HONNEUR DE PHILIPPE MANIN, 2009)
(The Honorable Jacques Biancarelli is a Conseiller d'Etat); Sauvé, supra note 1 at 9; Bernard
Stirn, Le Conseil d'Etat et les jurisdictions communautaires: un demi-siècle de dialogue des
juges, in 40.2 GAZETTE DU PALAIS 3-7, at 3 (2009) (The Honorable Bernard Stirn is President of
the Litigation Section of the Council of State); Canivet supra note 11 at 1971; Huglo supra note
10 at 1972-78; Christophe Soulard, L'application du droit communautaire par la chambre
criminelle de la Cour de cassation, in id., at 1991-2001 (The Honorable Christophe Soulard is a
Conseiller réferendaire at the Court of Cassation).
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change the narrative of French-EU judicial relations from a "war of the judges" to a
similarly broad "dialogue of the judges,"25 one needs more than anecdotal evidence of such
cooperation. One must empirically demonstrate the extent of judicial integration of the EU
legal order in France by looking at how the French High Courts have applied domestic law
in contemplation of European directives. Surely, the ideal balance between wealth of
information and generalization in studies of European judicial integration could be reached
by a series of country-specific empirical studies, like the present one, where patterns of
judicial integration are investigated, and the picture sketched by supranational research
complemented. To accomplish this goal, at least with respect to France, one must first
understand the lay of the judicial landscape, a matter to which I now turn.
II.

The Uniqueness of Review in France and the Constitutional Council
A.

The Nature of Review in France

To understand how EU-conformity litigation sprung from the Constitutional
Council's jurisprudence to become a full-fledged review system operated by the Court of
Cassation and the Council of State, one must first disabuse oneself of the notion that French
judges engage in "judicial review," as the term is traditionally employed this side of the
Atlantic. Clearly, the term cannot be used in countries like France, where ordinary judges
and courts lack the power to adjudicate the constitutionality of legislated law, whether in
as-applied or facial challenges.26 In fact, in much of Continental Europe, the task of the
judiciary has been merely to guarantee the supremacy of parliamentary acts over decrees,
regulations and administrative acts. This does not mean that constitutional provisions are
parameters to be employed solely by legislators as they consider enacting statutes. Rather,
it means that only a certain type of court, the constitutional court, has subject-matter
jurisdiction over constitutional disputes. In fact, the detachment of constitutional courts
from the hierarchy of the judiciary (broadly understood)27 mirrors the detachment of
constitutional law from the hierarchy of infra-constitutional laws, further demonstrating the
separation between constitutional and infra-constitutional law. This separate reserve for
constitutional-order questions also explains why, traditionally, the competence of
constitutional courts was limited to answering discrete constitutional questions referred to
them by a very limited number of actors: certain politicians (i.e., the few who until recently
held the monopoly on standing to trigger constitutional review in France) or High Courts
(as it has been the case in Spain, Italy and, since 2010, France). Clearly, such referrals
from the legislature and the judiciary to national constitutional courts constitute a form of
abstract constitutional adjudication far removed from the traditional "case or controversy"
judicial review that takes place in the United States.

25

These expressions have been attributed to Advocate-General Bruno Genevois. See Stirn,
supra note 24 at 3.
26

See Martin J. Shapiro and Alec Stone Sweet, Introduction: The New Constitutional
Politics, 26 COMP. POL. STUD. 397, 400 (1994).
27

From now on, I use the terms "judiciary" and "judicial" (and their variations)
indiscriminately to include all judges in France's two legal orders (judicial and administrative),
but not the detached Constitutional Council.
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Indeed, using judicial review to describe the work of judges is even more
problematic in France, where Jean-Jacques Rousseau's thinking on separation of powers led
to their subjugation to legislative authority.28 In 1790, the legislature created the
predecessor to today's Court of Cassation and placed it under its supervision to ensure that
judges nominated during the Ancien Régime did not interpret the new laws against the
interests of Revolutionary France.29 Although the Revolutionary period's strong version of
legislative sovereignty has long been abandoned, legislative supremacy, in its moderate
versions, greatly influenced the formation of France's bifurcated judiciary and thus remains
a part of French legal culture.30
Finally, even the recent constitutional reform, which gave the Constitutional
Council the authority to displace legislated law deemed constitutionally infirm, placed far
more restrictions on this form of review than is typically placed on traditional versions of
judicial review.31 For instance, the Council only hears referrals, so no writ mechanism
links ordinary citizens with the Council or gives it discretion to choose the cases it reviews.
Rather, the Council's task is to answer questions prioritaires de constitutionnalité, i.e.,
incidental questions involving constitutional issues in live cases pending before the French
courts. Procedurally, the Council only takes jurisdiction over the question presented to it,
not the entire case.32 These distinctions suggest that, clearly, it is best to use the broader
term "review" adding to it a more contextually adequate qualifier—as in constitutional
review versus conformity review, abstract review versus concrete review, or some other
adjective—rather than falling prey to applying familiar but not necessarily overlapping
concepts. With these qualifications in mind, the path is now clear to explain how
conformity review appeared as a second system of review in France.
28

This subjugation is implicit in Rousseau's belief that "the law is the expression of General
Will," also inscribed in article 6 of the 1789 Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen.
29

See Decree of November August 16-24, 1790, in 1 COLLECTION COMPLÈTE DES LOIS,
DÉCRETS, ORDONANCES, RÈGLEMENTS, ET AVIS DU CONSEIL D'ETAT, 361 (J. Duvergier, ed.,

1824).

30

It is quite significant that French judges and courts are only briefly mentioned in the French
Constitution as the "Judiciary Authority," now placed under the supervision of the President. See
1958 CONST., art. 64. Note that the last obstacle to ex post judicial review of all primary
legislation was finally removed in France in 2008 (review began in 2010).
31

See Constitutional Law no. 2008-724, supra note 16, article 29 (providing the new text of
article 61 of the French Constitution). See also Organic Law No. 2009-1523 of December 10,
2009 (providing statutory implementation of art. 61-1 of the Constitution); Decree No. 2010-148
of February 16, 2010 (presidential order implementing the Organic Law and providing the
procedure to be followed by the Council of State and Cassation) and Constitutional Council
February 4, 2010 Decision on Internal Rules (Règlement Intérieur) of Procedure for Priority
Questions of Constitutionality ("PQC"), available at http://www.conseil-constitutionnel.fr/
conseil-constitutionnel/francais/les-decisions/acces-par-date/decisions-depuis-1959/2010/
reglement-interieur-qpc/decision-reglement-interieur-qpc-du-04-fevrier-2010.47904.html.
32

See 1958 CONST., art. 61-1 (as amended). The amended Article 61 does increase the
jurisdiction of the French constitutional court beyond ex ante abstract review into ex post,
concrete review, but it also gives the Court of Cassation and Council of State the important
authority to decide which cases are worthy of referral. See 1958 CONST., art. 61-1.
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The Constitutional Council and the Evolution of Its Jurisdiction
1.

The Early Years

The Constitution of the Fifth Republic (1958) created a new system of government
in France: one that established presidential primacy over the Parliament.33 Michel Debré,
de Gaulle's Prime Minister, key political ally and the major drafter of the 1958
Constitution, summarized this political oxymoron best when he described the Constitution
"as a 'parliamentary régime' in which the presidency was 'the keystone'."34 Despite the
decline in Parliament's power, due to the emergence of the presidency, and the introduction
of constitutional review, promulgated statutes retained their status as the expression of the
"General Will" and, thus, could not be displaced by either the newly created Constitutional
Council or France's judiciary.35
In fact, so unswerving was the framer's adherence to parliamentary sovereignty that
ex post review was placed outside the purview of the Constitutional Council or of any other
court in France. As the logic of the times seemed to dictate, article 61 would not confer on
the Council any express jurisdiction over fundamental rights—these could be used to strike
down approved laws that did not conform to constitutional rights. Rather, article 61
appeared to circumscribe the scope of Council constitutional review simply to questions
regarding the constitutionality of Acts of Parliament.36 This meant that Council review
would be deployed exclusively to ensure that Parliament would not act beyond the confines
of its article 34 powers, so as not to encroach on the President's constitutional prerogatives.
Operationally, this lack of jurisdiction over disputes involving the constitutionality
of promulgated law required that Council review occur during the brief period between
parliamentary passage of a new bill and presidential promulgation, that is, before a statute
33

See 1958 CONST., arts. 5-19.

34

ANDREW KNAPP AND VINCENT WRIGHT, THE GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS OF FRANCE, 59
(Routledge, 2006). Michel Debré was Minister of Justice during elaboration of the 1958
Constitution. See Jean-Louis Debré, Chief-Justice (Premier président), Constitutional Council,
Clôture, Closing Address at Colloque du 3 Novembre 2008, 50ème anniversaire du Conseil
constitutionnel, in LES CAHIERS DU CONSEIL CONSTITUTIONNEL, 87, 89 (2009) (out-of-series
volume).
35

See 1958 CONST., art. 61 (as amended). In fact, a proposal giving Cassation and the
Council of State the power to refer to the Constitutional Council questions regarding the
constitutionality of statutes in concrete cases was rejected by the original framers largely on
grounds that it would introduce a "government of judges," revealing the strong mistrust of the
judiciary among the French political classes, both left and right. See TRAVAUX PRÉPARATOIRES
DE LA CONSTITUTION DU 4 OCTOBRE 1958, AVIS ET DÉBATS DU COMITÉ CONSULTATIVE
CONSTITUTIONNEL (Documentation Française, 1960), 75-80, 101-02, 164-65. This mistrust is
best illustrated by article 64 of the Constitution, which, instead of treating the judiciary separately
as a branch of the state, calls it "judicial authority," thus reducing its designation merely to the
task it performs.
36

The Constitutional Council also had (and it still has) original jurisdiction over disputes
regarding the regularity of presidential elections and observance of the internal rules of the two
Chambers of Parliament. See 1958 CONST., art. 61. This jurisdiction of the Council is not
relevant to the discussion in this article.
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was finally "on the books." In other words, review was necessarily a priori and, thus,
abstract in nature.37 Furthermore, to foreclose the Council from ever displacing
parliamentary majorities' choices where the President's political interests were in no way
threatened, the drafters reserved the right to refer laws to the Council to only a few major
political actors: the President of the Republic, the Prime-Minister and the Presidents of
both Chambers of Parliament.38 Clearly, this design vastly maximized institutional stability
at the cost of suppressing minority opposition and citizen input. It also meant that the
Constitutional Council was not born a full-blown constitutional court, rather it was
expected to perform the role of a quasi-judicial appendage of Parliament, thus allowing the
consolidation of presidential powers in the first years of the Fifth Republic.39 As expected,
there were few referrals during this early period, none of which included a constitutional
question of great political salience.40 The Council's limited constitutional jurisdiction, no
doubt part and parcel of an institutional design meant to further the role of the presidency
in the French political and constitutional order, would undergo major transformations in the
1970s.
2.

The Birth of Positive Constitutional Review

Few decisions are as transformative to a legal order—and surely to the reviewing
body that announces them—as those establishing entirely novel competencies. France's
"Marbury41 moment" came with the Constitutional Council's Liberté d'Association ruling.42
The July 16, 1971 decision resulted from a referral by Alain Poher, the President of the
Senate and former candidate for the presidency in 1968.43 Mr. Poher triggered the events
by referring a challenge to the constitutionality of a National Assembly-approved bill
meant to give certain superior officers in the national administration (i.e., préfets) the right

37

See 1958 CONST., art. 61.

38

See id.

39

See SWEET, supra note 18 at 41.

40

Only 45 constitutional challenges were referred to the Council between 1958 and 1971.
See Louis Favoreu & Loïc Philip, LES GRANDES DÉCISIONS DU CONSEIL CONSTITUTIONNEL 937,
937-38 (2007) (14th ed. Dalloz).
41

See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137 (1803) (Cranch) (holding that a judge's oath to uphold
the Constitution and the Supremacy Clause implicitly authorize courts to review and strike down
Acts of Congress deemed contrary to the Constitution).
42

Liberté d'Association, 71-44 DC, REC. 29, RJC I-24 (July 16, 1971) (considérant 2)
(declaring "in the name of the fundamental principles recognized by the laws of the Republic and
solemnly reaffirmed by the Preamble of the [1958] Constitution," which also references the
preamble of the 1946 Constitution and the 1789 Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the
Citizen, that a constitutional right of free association exists, according to which all associations
shall be constituted and governed by the sole will of their members) (emphasis added), available
at http://www.conseil-constitutionnel.fr/conseil-constitutionnel/francais/les-decisions/depuis1958/decisions-par-date/1971/71-44-dc/decision-n-71-44-dc-du-16-juillet-1971.7217.html.
43

See Ponthoreau & Hourquebie, supra note 22 at 276.
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to refuse credentialing civil organizations deemed to threaten the integrity of the French
state and the public order.44
From the Council's perspective, considering the merits of this referral marked, by
itself, a significant shift: it meant transcending the typically negative nature of its
encroachment review of Parliament into the potentially rights-creating, hence positive,
review of the content of a particular fundamental right. The Council found this authority in
the "fundamental principles recognized under the laws of the Republic and solemnly
reaffirmed in the Preamble" of the 1958 Constitution,45 the latter containing references to
numerous sources of fundamental rights, such as the Declaration of Rights of Man of 1789
and the Preamble of the 1946 Constitution.46 Given the political and institutional stakes
involved, the Council's holding in Liberté d'Association—invalidating portions of the bill
due to violations of the right of free association—while significant, was far less
consequential than its decision to incorporate sources of substantive economic and social
rights into the bloc de constitutionnalité, against which all future bills would be evaluated.
For in promoting such incorporation, the Council effectively opened the gates to positive
constitutional adjudication.
Yet, opening the gates would not amount to much without a steady flow of
referrals. During the early years, their volume and relevance remained severely
constrained due to rules that bestowed on few political actors the standing to initiate such
review. Certainly, it did not help that these actors until then had belonged to the same
center-right/right majority, to whom making frequent referrals would be counterproductive.
The Constitutional Reform of 1974 relaxed standing requirements and, thus, gave a further
boost to the Council's newfound constitutional powers. Cognizant of his narrow electoral
victory in the 1974 presidential election and seeking to create safeguards against a future
leftist government, President Valéry Giscard d'Estaing successfully proposed a
constitutional amendment extending to any combination of 60 Deputies or 60 Senators the
right to refer legislation to the Council.47 By giving minority coalitions, i.e., the
opposition, the right to trigger constitutional review of bills, the amended article 61
provided the caseload the Council needed to perform its new mission as a positive
constitutional adjudicator. In fact, adding the opposition to the roster of referring
authorities caused an explosion in the number of referrals: in contrast with 51 referrals in
its first 15 years (1958-73), the Council entertained a total of 221 referrals in the following
15 years (1974-89), a more than fourfold increase (i.e., 423%) in the Council's
constitutional docket.48
C.

The Strange Birth of Conformity Review in France

Just as the growth in the Council's constitutional activity was about to take off, at a
time when its members and the political class had not yet become accustomed to the idea
44

See Favoreu & Philip, supra note 40 at 238 n. 2.

45

See Liberté d'association, REC. 29 (considérant 2.).

46

See 1958 CONST., Preamble.

47

See Ponthoreau & Hourquebie, supra note 22 at 276-77.

48

See Favoreu & Philip, supra note 40 at 937-54.
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that parliamentary bills can be overridden by positive constitutional adjudicators, the
Council entertained a case that would profoundly affect the manner in which all French
judges would approach the relationship between national law and France's international
commitments. On December 20, 1974 a splinter group of majority coalition Deputies,
dissatisfied with a government-sponsored bill that allowed abortions prior to the tenth week
of the gestational period in situations of "mother distress," relied on the recently amended
article 61 to challenge the bill's constitutionality and international conformity.49 Reviewing
the bill strictly as a referral under article 61, the Council declared that the challenged
provision did not violate the individual freedom (i.e., liberté) "enunciated in article 2 of the
Declaration of the Rights of Man and the Citizen,"50 and thus held the bill as
constitutional.51 However, when pressed to determine whether the national legislation
conformed to the European Convention of Human Rights, the Council deferred. The
Council reasoned that, by virtue of the "difference in the nature of these two reviews,"52
i.e., constitutional review (pursuant to art. 61) and conformity review (pursuant to article
5553), "it lacked competence, once seized under article 61, to evaluate the conformity of a
[national] law with the provisions of a treaty or an international agreement," the latter an
attribution of article 55.54
By adopting this interpretation, the Council abdicated from conducting review of
legislation for compliance with France's international commitments. This occurred at a
moment when the process of European integration was accelerating. In hindsight, the
Council's decision to pass on conformity review seems remarkable and unwise. French
scholars have written volumes criticizing IVG,55 some even pondering how the Council
could abandon it.56 While addressing these criticisms would require going beyond the
scope of this study, suffice it to say that, logistically, the Council was not prepared then
(and, in my view, is still not prepared now) to be confronted with one more expansion on
its jurisction given the compressed timeframe under which it operates (30 days).57 Still, the
49

See id. at 298. Remarkably, French legal historians have told this author that, since the
1974 Reform, this remains the only instance in which the majority has referred a bill to the
Council.
50

See Interruption volontaire de grossesse, 74-54 DC, REC. 19, RJC I-30 (January 15, 1975)
(considérant 8) ("IVG"), available at http://www.conseil-constitutionnel.fr/conseilconstitutionnel/francais/les-decisions/depuis-1958/decisions-par-date/1975/74-54-dc/decision-n74-54-dc-du-15-janvier-1975.7423.html.
51

See IVG, REC. 19 (Article premier).

52

See Id. (considérant 6).

53

Article 55 provides: "Treaties or agreements duly ratified or approved shall, upon
publication, prevail over Acts of Parliament, subject, with respect to each agreement or treaty, to
its application by the other party." 1958 CONST.
54

See IVG, REC. 19 (considérant 7).

55

For a sample of these studies, see Favoreu & Philip, supra note 40 at 291.

56

Guy Carcassone & Bruno Genevois, Faut-il maintenir la jurisprudence issue de la décision
n°74-54 DC du 15 janvier 1975?, 7 CAHIERS DU CONSEIL CONSTITUTIONNEL 95 (1999).
57

See 1958 CONST., art. 61.
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bigger story here lies elsewhere, for, despite the Council's narrow construction of its article
61 jurisdiction, conformity review did not go without effective judicial supervision in
France.
III.

The Emergence of Conformity Review: Enter Cassation and Council of State

Conformity review emerged in France in three stages: first, barely four months after
IVG, at Cassation; second, fifteen years later, at a reluctant Council of State; and, finally, at
the Constitutional Council, in 2004, and this only after a constitutional amendment
expressly incorporated EU law into domestic law.58 Such incorporation prompted the
Council to engage in a new, quite narrow form of conformity review, still subsumed under
its traditional abstract constitutional review.59 While somewhat confusing, this staggered
adoption of conformity review reflects the High Courts' perceptions of their roles and
capabilities, as well as their differing views on European integration overtime, which has
also contributed to their being perceived as varying in their commitment to European
judicial integration.60 After a brief description of the evolution of this new form of review
in these Courts, this article will turn to an analysis of the empirical validity of such
perceptions and other hypotheses.
A.

Cassation's Embrace of Conformity Review

Soon after IVG, Cassation entertained an appeal from a decision by the Appellate
Court of Paris that had invalidated a French consumption tax (article 265 of the French
Customs Code) due to its incompatibility with article 95 of the Treaty of Rome.61
Remarkably, Advocate General (Procureur Général) Touffait urged Cassation to
embrace conformity review and maintain the decision to strike down the French statute
solely on Treaty of Rome grounds. The idea behind basing this decision on this sole
independent legal ground was to establish that the supremacy of EU law in France rested
not merely on French constitutional law (i.e., article 55 of the Constitution, hence the
provenance of the Council), but on EU law itself (i.e., the Treaty of Rome as construed

58

The constitutional reform of 1992, which allowed the ratification of the Maastricht Treaty,
altered article 88 of the Constitution by giving EU law a specific constitutional status in French
law. The amended article 88-I reads: "The Republic shall participate in the European
Communities and in the [EU] constituted by States which have freely chosen by virtue of the
treaties which established them to exercise some of their powers in common." 1958 CONST.
59

See Loi pour la confiance dans l'économie numérique, 2004-496 DC (June 10, 2004)
(considérant 7) (declaring that "the transposition of a Community directive into domestic law is a
constitutional requirement" and that, as such, laws of transposition are subject to review)
("Economie numérique"), available at http://www.conseil-constitutionnel.fr/conseilconstitutionnel/francais/les-decisions/acces-par-date/decisions-depuis-1959/2004/2004-496dc/decision-n-2004-496-dc-du-10-juin-2004.901.html.
60

For a rare commentary in English illustrating the conventional wisdom regarding the
different approaches the Council of State and Cassation have adopted with respect to EU law, see
Groussot, supra note 22 at 35-36.
61

Société des Cafés Jacques Vabre, Cass., Ch. Mixte, D. 1974, 159 (May 24, 1975)
("Vabre").
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by the ECJ,62 the provenance of French judges as ordinary judges of Communitarian
law). To Touffait, the principle that EU law applies in France as a result of its
concurrent, yet independent, sovereignty with the Constitution derived from the fact that
"the transfer of power made by the Member States from their internal legal orders in
favor of the legal order of the Community" had operated a "definitive limitation of their
sovereign rights."63 In sum, EU law was binding regardless of its status in French law.
Despite prior ECJ rulings on Communitarian law's supremacy and self-executing
status, to make such a proposition to Cassation at that time might have seemed radical if
one considers the history of legislative supremacy in France. However, in light of France's
obligation to bring its laws into conformity with Communitarian law and the Constitutional
Council's major abdication of conformity jurisdiction in IVG, it was necessary to fill that
void. Indeed, the Advocate General expressly recognized the need for conformity review
of French statutes by stating that "from the position taken by the Council, one can thus
conclude that it falls on the courts before which this problem has been presented, and it
inheres to them alone, under penalty of denial of justice, the task of addressing it."65
Cassation accepted the invitation and became the first French High Court to strike down a
national statute (not merely a bill) for incompatibility with the Treaty of Rome. Yet, while
recognizing that the Treaty of Rome had created a "separate legal order," the Justices at
Cassation still referred to article 55's treaty supremacy clause as concurrent authority.66
64

B.

Council of State's Delayed Embrace of Conformity Review

The uninitiated in French judicial history will find it quite remarkable that the
Council of State would only take up conformity review in 1989, fifteen years after
Cassation's Vabre decision. Holding to the tradition that the administrative judge is not
to review the validity of legislation, the Council of State refused to take this step even as
other notoriously recalcitrant national courts in Europe—the German Federal
Constitutional Court (1971) and the Italian Constitutional Court (1984)—had finally
accepted setting aside domestic statutes contrary to Communitarian law.67 However, the
62

See infra note 64.

63

Id. (Opinion of the Advocate General)

64

Case 6/64, Costa v. Enel, 1964 E.C.R. 585 (holding that "the transfer by the states from
their domestic legal system to the Community legal system of the rights and obligations arising
under the Treaty [of Rome] carries with it a permanent limitation of their sovereign rights, against
which a subsequent unilateral act incompatible with the concept of the Community cannot
prevail.") ("Costa"); Case 41/74, Van Duyn v. Home Office, 1974 E.C.R. 1337(holding that, just
as regulations, directives "are directly applicable and, consequently, may by their very nature
have direct effects," in Member states' national legal orders.) ("Van Duyn").
65

Vabre (Opinion of the Advocate General).

66

See id. (Judgment of the Court).

67

Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG] [Federal Constitutional Court] Jun. 9, 1971, 31
Entscheidungen des Bundesverfassungsgerichts [BVerfGE] 145 (F.R.G.) (holding that ordinary
"German courts must also apply legal provisions which, though attributable to an autonomous
sovereign power outside the State, do nevertheless on the basis of their interpretation by the [ECJ]
develop direct effect within the State and override and displace contrary national law."); S.p.a.
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case for change would become yet more compelling in 1988, when the Constitutional
Council itself, exercising its sole "as applied" jurisdiction as France's electoral Supreme
Court (article 59), held that a French statute (the Act of July 11, 1986) conformed with
Protocol No. 1 of the European Convention on Human Rights, thereby engaging in
conformity review.68 All these developments left the Council of State no other option but
to break with tradition.
The opportunity for change presented itself in a challenge to the conduct of
European Parliament elections by two French voters, Messrs. Nicolo and Roujansky.69
Specifically, the plaintiffs contested the participation of French citizens from the overseas
departments in the election of representatives to the European Parliament based on an
interpretation of a French statute (the Act of July 7, 1977) that would bring it into conflict
with article 19 of the Treaty of Rome. Patrick Frydman, a mid-level officer in the
Council of State (Maître de requettes), appearing as Solicitor in the case (Commissaire
du Gouvernement),70 called the Justices to uphold the Treaty of Rome over subsequent
national law on the theory that article 55's supremacy language "necessarily enable[d] the
courts, by implication, to review the compatibility of statutes with treaties."71 Frydman
reasoned that article 55 "establish[ed] a system of priority for different rules," and thus
was "addressed primarily to the courts." 72 He assured the Justices that, in giving the
Treaty precedence over later statutes, they would not abolish legislative supremacy
completely, for such review "relate[s] only to reviewing compatibility of statutes with
treaties." 73 Thus, Frydman's argument for conformity review was premised on a
different supremacy rationale: unlike Touffait's concurrent supremacy theory, his was an
argument for upholding the Treaty of Rome as a matter of French (constitutional) law.

Granital v. Amministrazione delle Finanze dello Stato, Corte costituzionale, 8 jun. 1984, n.170,
Guir. It., I, 1521 (holding that "conflicting provisions in a national statute cannot constitute an
obstacle to the recognition of the binding force conferred by the Treaty [of Rome] on Community
regulations as a source of directly applicable rules.").
68

See Assemblée nationale, Val-d'Oise (5ème circ.), CC decision no. 88-1082/1117, Oct. 21,

1988.
69

See Raoul Georges Nicolo, Council of State, Ass., R.F.D.A. 1989, 813 (Oct. 20, 1989)
("Nicolo").
70

Since February 2009, the official designation for the post of Solicitor at the Council of
State has changed from Commissaire du Gouvernement to Rapporteur public. See Décret n°
2009-14 du 7 janvier 2009 relatif au rapporteur public des juridictions administratives et au
déroulement de l'audience devant ces juridictions, JORF n°0006 du 8 janvier 2009 page 479,
texte n° 8, available at
http://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/affichTexte.do?cidTexte=JORFTEXT000020046644&dateTexte=
&categorieLien=id.
71

Nicolo, R.F.D.A. at 813 (Opinion of the Solicitor).

72

Id. This rationale for conformity review closely tracks Justice Marshall's SupremacyClause-inspired rationale for judicial review. See Marbury, 5 U.S. at 178-79.
73

Nicolo, R.F.D.A. at 813 (Opinion of the Solicitor).
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Seeking to end its isolation in Europe and among the French Courts, the Council
of State seized upon this opportunity and embraced conformity review by holding that the
French electoral statute did not violate the Treaty; doing so, however, pursuant to the
authority deemed implicit under article 55.74 With legislative supremacy now a part of
the past—at least with respect to treaty-law—the Court positioned itself to shape
Communitarian law and, thus, participate in a process that had been in operation for more
than three decades. Viewed in this perspective, Nicolo was as revolutionary as it was
reactive. It was part of a phenomenon taking place throughout Europe, where national
courts, operating under the growing pressure of ECJ and ECHR precedent, sought to
secure a role in the evolution of European law so as to, in the words of Frydman, "break
their monopoly."75
C.

Conformity Review Resurfaces in the Constitutional Council

Facing similar external and internal pressures, but lacking "as applied" authority
(except on electoral law) per IVG, the Constitutional Council's ability to participate in the
interpretation of European law in France was quite restricted. In fact, the adoption of
conformity review by the other French High Courts might have delayed the arrival of
concrete (i.e., ex post) constitutional review in France, the other method through which
the Council could potentially influence the interpretation of French law vis-à-vis France's
European commitments. In fact, as Cassation and the Council of State grew accustomed
to reviewing the compatibility of French statutes with European law, which itself had
been incorporating fundamental rights through ECJ and ECHR adjudication (which often
targeted national laws), a form of de facto, "as applied" constitutional review came into
existence in France.76 For instance, in the year 2001 alone, the Council of State
entertained over 2,000 challenges to the conformity of domestic measures to the
European Convention of Human Rights.77
Still, in the realm of abstract (i.e., ex ante) constitutional review, the Council had
some room to maneuver to become a relevant player in interpreting EU law in France.
Yet, doing so without reversing IVG—and thereby incurring the heavy administrative
burdens that it had originally sought to avoid—was the challenge. The Council would
finally accomplish this feat in 2004, by embracing a nuanced (not surprisingly) version of
conformity review, engineered through a measured withdrawal from IVG's extreme
position.78 A group of opposition Deputies and Senators referred a bill that, among other
things, transposed an EU directive (No. 2000/31/CE, July 8, 2000) and regulated several
74

See Nicolo, R.F.D.A. at 813.

75

Id. (Opinion of the Solicitor).

76

For a discussion on the growing constitutional nature of ECJ and ECHR review through
fundamental rights adjudication, see SWEET, supra note 18.
77

OLIVIER DUTHEILLET DE LAMOTHE, CONSTITUTIONAL REVIEW AND CONVENTIONAL
REVIEW 1, 9 (2008) (The Honorable Olivier Dutheillet de Lamothe, writing then as an AssociateJustice (Membre) of the Constitutional Council, has recently retired after serving two terms in the
Court). The reader is reminded that review pursuant to the Convention is outside the scope of this
article.
78

See Economie numérique.
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aspects of electronic commerce and messaging. They challenged that, as written, the bill
violated the constitutionally protected rights of privacy and individual freedom of
communication (article 34).79 Article 88-I—the product of the 1992 constitutional reform
that ratified the Treaty on European Union—had promoted the incorporation of EU law
in the French legal order. In it, the Council found a specific, novel constitutional
authorization for reviewing the conformity of transposing laws to directives, on the
theory that the obligation to "transpos[e] . . . results from a constitutional requirement."80
Accordingly, the Council announced it would now engage in conformity review, even
when seized under article 61, a clear departure from IVG. Only this time, article 88-I's
specific bestowal of supremacy on EU law would provide the rationale, not article 55, as
that path remains foreclosed by the portion of IVG that still governs.81
The Council was extremely careful in establishing the scope of this nascent
review. Specifically, by construing its role under article 88-I as solely that of a guardian
of the constitutional obligation to transpose, the Council ensured that it would only
exercise review over one type of national norm: laws of transposition. This meant that
bills not expressly designed to accomplish transposition, yet somehow conflicting with
existing directives, would not be reviewed. Under the Council's narrow interpretation,
the nonconformity of a law, other than a law of transposition, was not a violation of
article 88-I's constitutional requirement of transposition. Yet, as Parliament enacts
several laws every year, which may overlap with existing directives, deciding to skip
review of laws not of transposition, while not an oversight, is a significant abdication of
jurisdiction. Moreover, the Council also declined jurisdiction to consider referrals
challenging legislative provisions that do no more than transpose the "direct, necessary
and precise" effects of a directive,82 apparently on the belief that the routine job of
assuring that national measures give direct effect to secondary Communitarian law falls
on ordinary French judges in their role as Communitarian law judges.83 Thus, the
Council limited the scope of its own conformity review to (i) ruling on the conformity of
bills expressly designated as laws of transposition; and, as to this particular type of bill,
(ii) examining nontrivial questions pertaining to their constitutional duty to transpose.
Yet, even as the Council recognized transposition as a constitutional obligation, it
made another important reservation: transposing bills that violate "express constitutional
provisions,"84 or principles "inherent to the constitutional identity of France,"85 would be
79

See id. (considérants 4 & 6).

80

Id. (considérant 7) (emphasis added).

81

Compare IVG, REC. 19 (considérants 2 & 7) with Economie numérique (considérant 7).

82

Economie numérique (considérant 9).

83

Pierre Mazeaud, L'ÉVOLUTION DE LA JURISPRUDENCE DU CONSEIL CONSTITUTIONNEL SUR
LES LOIS DE TRANSPOSITION DES DIRECTIVES, L'ADMINISTRATION FRANÇAISE ET L'UNION
EUROPÉENNE: QUELLES INFLUENCES? QUELLES STRATÉGIES, rapport public du Conseil d'Etat
398-99 (2007) (The Honorable Pierre Mazeaud, writing then as Chief-Justice of the
Constitutional Council), available at http://www.conseil-constitutionnel.fr/conseilconstitutionnel/root/bank_mm/pdf/Conseil/20061215.pdf.
84

Economie numérique (considérant 7).
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invalidated.86 This meant that it placed secondary Communitarian law under the French
Constitution, thereby underscoring the constitutional character of the Council's
conformity review. In announcing this new version of conformity qua constitutional
review, the Council managed to rebalance its powers to optimize several aspects of its
role as a constitutional court in a changing European legal landscape. First, by reviewing
only the most complicated questions regarding interpretation of laws of transposition, it
did not greatly disturb the balance of power among French courts. Second, in narrowing
the scope of review to such laws, it protected the twin policy aims of IVG, namely (i)
focusing on its role as a constitutional reviewer; and (ii) controlling its docket in light of
the time constraints under which it operates. Finally, in directly engaging with EU law,
the Council furthered the process of EU legal integration, although it remained
anachronistically beholden to the view that EU law owes its supremacy to its foundations
in France's constitutional order.
That national courts would retain such views, even as the ECJ had long declared
the (unconditional) supremacy and direct effects of EU law, is not surprising.87 Other
European national Courts had done the same.88 Indeed, the adoption of such parochial
conceptions of EU law supremacy is the result of historical judicial turf wars (la guerre
des juges), with national courts reacting and adapting to the decline of national law as EU
integration proceeds and the influence of ECJ jurisprudence grows. These "wars" are
also responsive to another dynamic: the institutional rivalry among national High Courts.
In this sense, the ready acceptance of conformity review by Cassation and its late,
begrudging, adoption by the Council of State and the Constitutional Council are the result
of a multi-causal, highly interactive process. Regardless of one's beliefs as to the relative
contribution of external and internal factors to the emergence of conformity review in
France, it seems clear that, among the three High Courts, Cassation was the only one to
embrace a concurrent theory of EU law supremacy in France. Both the Council of State
(article 55) and the Constitutional Council (article 88-I) firmly grounded their duty to
ensure conformity solely on French Constitutional grounds. This article now attempts to
empirically verify whether these Courts' different views on the status of Communitarian
law result in different levels of directive enforcement in France.
85

See Loi relative au droit d'auteur et aux droits voisins dans la société de l'information,
2004-540 DC (July 27, 2006) (considérant 19).
86

Chief-Justice Mazeaud suggested France's republican attachment to secularism (laïcité) is
inherent to the constitutional identity of France. See Mazeaud, supra note 83 at 398-99.
87

See, e.g., Costa, E.C.R. 585 and Case 92/78, Amministrazione Delle Finanze Dello Stato v.
Simmenthal Spa, 1978 E.C.R. 629 (holding that Community law, from its entry into force,
"renders automatically inapplicable any conflicting provision of . . . national law," and "that it is
not necessary for . . . [national] courts to request or await the actual setting aside by the national
[legislative or executive] authorities . . . [so as not to] impede the direct and immediate
application of Community rules.") ("Simmenthal II").
88

See Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG] [Federal Constitutional Court] May 29, 1974, 37
Entscheidungen des Bundesverfassungsgerichts [BVerfGE] 27 (F.R.G.) (Internationale
Handelsgesellshaft MBH v. Einfuhr- Und Vurratsstelle Für Getreide Und Futtermittel) ("Solange
I") (Germany); Corte costituzionale, 21 apr. 1989, n.232 ("Fragd") (Italy); STC, Dec. 13, 2004
(No. 1) (Spain).
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Data Description and Methodology

To test whether distinct theories of EU law supremacy lead to different levels of
directive enforcement, I looked at quantifiable aspects of "directive cases" entertained by
these parallel adjudicatory systems. These quantifiable aspects ranged from establishing
the obvious, such as determining whether a directive was enforced, to coding for more
intricate variables, such as the type of national measure invoked (e.g., law of
transposition, etc.), the case's subject matter, the reasons for non-enforcement of a
directive (e.g., out of scope, procedural impediments, etc), whether the referral of a
preliminary question to the ECJ was requested or granted, the status of the litigants (e.g.,
private party or government), etc. I coded for these other variables to detect whether
differences in directive enforcement, if any, might be related to differences in these
Courts' dockets (mainly Cassation and Council of State),89 rather than differences in their
stated views on EU law supremacy. For instance, a substantial portion of Cassation's
civil and commercial docket involves private litigation. This can never occur in litigation
before the Council of State, France's Supreme Administrative Court, where the
government is invariably a litigant.90 In sum, coding for litigant status allowed me to
compare private party vs. government litigation (or vice-versa) in both Courts to ensure
that any difference that I might detect on the treatment of directives is not attributable to
differences in the type of litigants appearing before them.
A.

Defining a Directive Case

So far, I have used the term "directive challenges" to describe conformity cases
before France's three High Courts. In reality, I looked at more than just challenges
involving the conformity of national law to directives. I looked at all cases where a
litigant or a court, sua sponte, invoked both directives and national law in some manner.
Specifically, the point was to cover (i) direct conformity challenges of the type "directive
says X, national measure says Y (i.e., where Y somehow contradicts X), therefore enforce
X," (think intersecting circles in a Venn Diagram); (ii) claims for parallel enforcement, as
in "both directive and national measure say X, therefore enforce X" (think concentric
circles in a Venn Diagram); and (iii) situations where, depending on how the Court rules
on scope, "X displaces Y (or vice-versa)" (think separate, non-overlapping circles in a
Venn Diagram). This broad definition avoids under-inclusiveness, reduces complex
boundary issues (but does not eliminate them completely as I discuss later) and ensures
that the entire universe of directive conformity review is captured regardless of the
argument made or final determination reached.
B.

Data and Methods
1.

Period of Study

89

The focus on Cassation and the Council of State in this empirical section owes to the fact
that the Constitutional Council has entertained only 8 conformity review referrals since its June
10, 2004 Economie numérique decision. See infra note 94.
90

For the reasons adduced in Parts II and III.C, the government is also always a litigant
before the Constitutional Council.
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I collected data covering completed results of conformity review in the period
from October 20, 1989 to December 31, 2008. The reader will recall the initial date as
the day the Council of State announced its Nicolo decision. That choice owes to the fact
that any comparison between the two French Courts that have handled the bulk of
conformity review cases (i.e., Cassation and Council of State) should begin only on or
after the second has embraced conformity review. Indeed, going back to 1975 would
produce uninteresting results: the Council of State would unequivocally and unfairly
appear as Europhobic merely due to its initial fourteen-year reluctance to overcome
legislative supremacy and review national laws.
2.

The Data

The three main sources of primary data were (1) the LamyLine Reflex database, a
French commercial subscription service containing French High Court reported
decisions; (2) the Legifrance Website, a government-funded legal Website; and (3) the
Websites and Intranet databases of Cassation,91 Council of State92 and Constitutional
Council.93 The combined use of these databases allowed me to focus my search on
directive cases, as described above, and ensured that, through different research queries, I
captured the entire population of directive cases adjudicated in these Courts.
3.

Assembling and Coding Cases

To avoid double-counting in situations where either Cassation or Council of State,
in considering a case, referred a prejudicial question pertaining to the interpretation of a
directive to the ECJ, I made sure that only the final Court decision, i.e., after ECJ input,
counted as a case, despite being assigned a different decision number (i.e., arrêt and
pourvoi, in Cassation and Council of State, respectively). Obviously, the ultimate
variable of interest in this study is each Court's level of directive enforcement, which I
calculated from the universe of directive cases they entertained. A directive is enforced
any time a party (or Court) invokes its application and the Court either expressly or
implicitly relies on it as it announces its decision. Because of the formulaic, nonnarrative style of French opinion writing, I had to check the final holdings of some
especially difficult implicit-enforcement cases against the opinions of either Advocate
General (Cassation) or Solicitor (Council of State) to finally ascertain whether a directive
was enforced or not. I also used this procedure to clear up questions with respect to the
other variables of interest in the study.
V.

Results and Analysis

As hypothesized earlier, should the conventional wisdom on how the French High
Courts approach EU law be correct, one would observe different rates of directive
91

I thank Isabelle Goanvic, Councilor (Conseiller référandaire) and Assistant Director of the
Documentation Section at Cassation for helping me with research on the Court's Intranet.
92

I thank Jacques Biancarelli, Councilor (Conseiller d'Etat) in charge of European Law at the
Council of State for his research advice and for allowing me to use the Court's Intranet.
93

I thank Lionel Brau, Director of the Library and Information Services Section at the
Constitutional Council and Guy Cleret, Librarian, for their invaluable research assistance during
my clerkship at the Council.

- 21 -

PLEASE DO NOT QUOTE OR CITE WITHOUT AUTHOR'S PERMISSION

DRAFT OF AUG. 29, 2011 (SC)

enforcement among them. Of course, the dearth of directive cases in the Constitutional
Council (8 cases), due to its late embrace of conformity review and restrictive standing
requirements, would not allow robust confirmation or refutation of the received view.
Indeed, in all such cases, the Constitutional Council enforced the directive.94 Table I
presents the number of directive cases heard by the three High Courts. The greater
number of Council of State and Cassation decisions explains why, from this point
forward, my analysis focuses solely on the conformity cases they entertained. All tables
and background information on statistical tests conducted are presented in the Appendix.
TABLE I: FRENCH HIGH COURTS' EU CONFORMITY REVIEW CASELOAD (1989-2008)
Court

Number of Cases

Constitutional Council (2004-08)
Council of State
Court of Cassation

8
465
462

A.

Do Cassation's and Council of State's Different Views on EU Law
Affect the Likelihood of Directive Enforcement?

A comparison of Cassation and Council of State directive enforcement rates (see
Table A) reveals that, among Cassation's 462 cases, directives were enforced 88 percent
of the time (407 cases), while 12 percent (55 cases) resulted in non-enforcement.
Remarkably, Council of State review results were essentially the same: rounded
enforcement/non-enforcement rates were 88 percent and 12 percent, respectively. These
results show not only that the French Courts share a high rate of directive enforcement,
but also that varying the reviewing Court has no impact on the likelihood of enforcement.
To discard the possibility that very small observed differences in raw percentages
could still produce a statistically significant relationship between ADJUDICATING COURT
and RATE OF DIRECTIVE ENFORCEMENT, I performed a Fisher's exact test. I obtained a p
value that far exceeded .05 (two-tailed), and thus could not corroborate the conventional
wisdom hypothesis that Council of State review is less likely to enforce directives than
Cassation review. That the source of review has no impact on the rate of directive
enforcement indicates that differences in these Courts' approach to EU law have not
played a role in whether directives are effectively enforced. This major finding negates
the anecdotal, no doubt historically influenced (see Part III), divergence theory.
94

See Loi relative aux organismes génétiquement modifiés, Decision No. 08-564DC, June 6,
2008; Loi relative au secteur de l'énergie, Decision no. 543-06DC, Nov. 30, 2006; Loi relative au
droit d'auteur et aux droits voisins dans la société de l'information Decision no. 546-06DC, July
27, 2006; Loi pour l'égalité des chances, Decision no. 535-06DC, Mar. 30, 2006; Loi relative à la
protection des personnes physiques à l'égard des traitements de données à caractère personnel,
Decision no. 499-04DC, July 29, 2004; Loi relative à la bioéthique, Decision no. 498-04DC, July
29, 2004; Loi relative aux communications électroniques et aux services de communication
audiovisuelle, Decision no. 497-04DC, July 1, 2004; Economie numérique, supra note 59.
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Effect of Differences in Cassation's and Council of State's Dockets
1.

Accounting for Litigant-Based Differences Between Cassation
and Council of State

In refuting the conventional wisdom, this study's major finding of similar rates of
directive enforcement must be checked against the possibility that, by aggregating all
cases each court handled, it ignored docket differences that might reveal how different
attitudes toward EU law supremacy impact the rate of enforcement. For instance, a critic
could object that such an aggregate comparison does not account for the fact that civil
and commercial cases, much of which is private litigation, make up about 68 percent of
Cassation's docket, whereas all litigation before the Council of State involves the
government.95 To account for this fact, I examined only private-to-government litigation
in Cassation's docket and compared it to the Council of State's docket.
a.

Initial Results

At first look, a comparison of the Courts' directive enforcement rates in privateto-government litigation does produce different results (see Table B1a). The reduction in
Cassation's volume of adjudication pushes the RATE OF DIRECTIVE ENFORCEMENT up to
about 95 percent (277 cases), which, compared to the 88 percent observed in the Council
of State, supports the conventional wisdom. Moreover, a p value of .002 corroborates the
hypothesis of a relationship between ADJUDICATING COURT and RATE OF DIRECTIVE
ENFORCEMENT. This result casts a shadow of doubt over the earlier finding of no
relationship reached by considering all cases. Therefore, I decided to investigate further
to detect if some cause other than these Courts' different views regarding EU law
supremacy might be responsible for this shift. I began by looking at the reasons for nonenforcement.
b.

A More Nuanced Look at Litigant-Based Differences:
Enter the Out-of-Scope Justification
i.

Finding Some Theoretical Hints

In a study of ECHR decisions, James Sweeney argues that national courts'
preferred justification for refusing to apply the Convention is to hold certain situations as
factually falling outside the scope of the Convention or ECHR jurisprudence, even when
a Convention provision is on point.96 Sweeney theorizes that, in recognition of the
Contracting Parties' "diverse political cultural backgrounds and traditions,"97 the ECHR
95

I obtained this percentage by averaging Cassation's volume of civil and commercial cases
as a proportion of total cases for 2006 and 2008, which I chose at random. See C. CASS.
RAPPORT ANNUEL (2008) pt. 5, at 371; id. (2006) pt. 5, at 475. Criminal prosecutions are the
other category of cases in its docket. In such cases, the state is represented by independent
prosecuting magistrates (i.e., ministère public or parquet) who "supervise the preliminary police
investigations" and ensure the proper exercise of the state power to prosecute and restrict the
liberty rights of the accused. See KNAPP & WRIGHT, supra note 34 at 397.
96

James Sweeney, Margins of Appreciation: Cultural Relativity and the European Court of
Human Rights in the Post-Cold War Era, 54 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 459, 462 (2005).
97

Id. at 463.
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tolerates this practice and affords domestic courts some measure of discretion so that
"they can balance for themselves conflicting public goods" in areas implicating major
domestic public policy.98
A similar version of this "margin of appreciation" argument appears in Xavier
Groussot's analysis of the relationship between EU law and French public law. Groussot
argues that, unlike Cassation, which does not hesitate to apply "general principles of
Community law to obligations resulting [purely] from internal law," the French
"administrative courts generally refuse to apply the general principles in purely internal
matters."99 He explains that, in the Council of State's view, general principles of EU law
"only apply in the national legal order when the situation falls within the scope of
Community law."100 As an illustration, he suggests and cites to recent opinions where the
Council of State only applied the general EU law principle of legitimate expectations in
situations coming squarely within the subject matter of a particular directive.101
This makes sense, for administrative review in France has traditionally had a
narrow focus, due to administrative judges' restrictive views of their role as mere
adjudicators of the legality of administrative acts for excès de pouvoir (i.e., ultra vires
review under strict objective legality).102 Clearly, French administrative judges are not at
all comfortable with the indefinite, loose-form method of review that is required to give
effect to the more subjective legitimate expectations principle. Groussot believes that
unease with this "far too indefinite"103 Communitarian law principle is behind the
Council of State's insistence on "a clear dichotomy between . . . internal law and matters
falling within the scope of Community law."104 If Groussot is right, the Council of
State's resistance to conducting a broader form of review might explain its lower rate of
directive enforcement. More importantly, that would renew doubts as to the validity of
the conventional wisdom: for if differences in the Council of State's and Cassation's own
margins of appreciation explain their different rates of directive enforcement in privateto-government adjudication, then adherence to different supremacy theories cannot take
all the credit.
ii.

Adjusting Litigant-Based Equalization for
Margin of Appreciation Differences

To account for this "margin of appreciation effect," I eliminated all nonenforcement decisions premised on out-of-scope justifications from both Cassation and
98

Id. at 462. Lupu and Voetten make a similar point in THE ROLE OF PRECEDENT AT THE
EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS: A NETWORK ANALYSIS OF CASE CITATIONS at 5-6, supra
note 18.
99

Groussot, supra note 22 at 35.

100

Id. at 39.

101

See id. at 39-40 and accompanying note 163.

102

See L. NEVILLE BROWN & JOHN S. BELL, FRENCH ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 203-04 (4th ed.

1993).
103

Groussot, supra note 22 at 40.

104

Id. at 39.
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Council of State datasets. This is justified because adherence to different scope-ofreview theories will affect whether and how often a Court refuses to enforce a directive
on out-of-scope grounds. Also, a Court's refusal to enforce a directive on out-of-scope
grounds is not technically a decision that national law trumps the directive, but a
statement that the directive simply cannot apply to a particular factual situation presented
in the case. Thus, removing out-of-scope cases from the dataset should provide a better
comparison between these two Courts when one considers the litigation involving the
same types of litigants (i.e., private parties and government). Furthermore, removing outof-scope decisions seems justified in light of the broad approach I took when assembling
both "directive case" databases (see discussion in Part IV.A above). Because I included
all cases where a litigant invoked both directives and national measures in some manner,
I may have included cases where the connection between directives and national
measures is remote at best. Therefore, removing out-of-scope cases should improve the
quality of the data while at the same time addressing the potential effect of nonsupremacy-motivated differences in margins of appreciation.
Comparing the Courts' directive enforcement rates in private-to-government
litigation without the out-of-scope cases in the data produced a remarkable result: the
equalization of litigant composition in Cassation and Council of State adjudication no
longer has any impact on the RATE OF DIRECTIVE ENFORCEMENT. That is, the Courts'
enforcement rates are now virtually the same (see Table B1b). The new comparison
shows that, among Cassation's 286 "private party vs. government cases," directives were
enforced 97 percent of the time (277 cases), while only 3 percent (9 cases) resulted in
non-enforcement. Remarkably, Council of State review results were essentially the
same: rounded enforcement/non-enforcement rates were 96 percent (407 cases) and 4
percent (15 cases), respectively. To check if these slight differences in raw percentages
amount to a statistically significant relationship between ADJUDICATING COURT and RATE
OF DIRECTIVE ENFORCEMENT, I performed a Fisher's exact test. Statistical testing (p
value approximately .835, two-tailed) refuted this hypothesis. Clearly, adjusting the
litigant-equalization table (Table B1a) for traditional scope-of-review differences
between the two Courts (Table B1b) reveals that ADJUDICATING COURT has no impact on
RATE OF DIRECTIVE ENFORCEMENT.
Again, this result discredits the anecdotal perception of a difference between the
two Courts grounded on their different views on EU law supremacy. While one could
hypothesize that the Council of State's EU law supremacy views might themselves
influence its more restrictive approach to the scope of administrative review, it can hardly
be denied that it adopts the same approach throughout its non-European jurisprudence.
History clearly shows that is the case. Simply put, the supremacy argument explains too
much. Thus, after careful reflection, once differences in the status of litigants before
these Courts are accounted for, one still cannot confirm the conventional view.
2.

Accounting for Differences in Domestic Laws Invoked Before
Cassation and Council of State

A closer look at the kinds of national measures (e.g., laws of transposition,
decrees, regulations, acts, etc.) invoked in directive cases before the two Courts reveals a
much lower frequency of adjudication involving laws of transposition before the Council
of State. After excluding out-of-scope litigation for the reasons discussed in the prior
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section, I found that while Cassation entertained 156 cases involving laws of
transposition, the Council of State entertained only 40 such cases (see Table B2a).
Because conformity review involves the possibility of setting aside different kinds of
national measures contrary to EU directives, and because the Council of State has seen
adjudication involving laws of transposition much less frequently, one might question the
appropriateness of comparing the two Courts' dockets, never mind reaching conclusions
that refute received views.
Before addressing this question empirically, it is important to realize why this
objection is not dispositive on theoretical grounds. The Council of State, in its concurrent
consultative, non-judicial capacity as advisor to the Parliament and government, analyzes
every piece of legislation proposed by the latter for conformity with French laws and
international commitments.105 In this consultative role, it conducts a formal prescreening
of every bill thus submitted, including proposed laws of transposition. This separate
reviewing process tends to eliminate flagrantly violating laws,106 which likely reduces the
number of transposing laws that will trigger future litigation. This might explain why, in
its "judicial" capacity, the Council of State entertains conformity challenges to laws of
transposition less frequently than Cassation, which has no consultative and hence no
prescreening role.107
Still, to respond to this challenge empirically, I segregated conformity
adjudication before these Courts into two tables: one considering solely law-oftransposition cases (see Table B2a), the other considering challenges to all other national
measures (see Table B2b). Looking solely at law-of-transposition adjudication, I found
that Cassation enforced directives 97 percent of the time (152 cases), while the Council
of State did so a bit less frequently, in approximately 93 percent of the cases (37 cases)
(see Table B2a). To check if this slight difference is statistically significant, I conducted
a Fisher's exact test and obtained a p value that exceeded .05 (two-tailed). Therefore,
there is no statistical difference in the RATE OF DIRECTIVE ENFORCEMENT between
Cassation and the Council of State when conformity cases involving laws of transposition
are considered alone. In sum, whether adjudicating private rights (droit subjectifs)
(Cassation) or the legality of administrative acts (legalité) (Council of State), when
considering the conformity of laws of transposition to directives (conformité objective),
each Court is just as likely to enforce directives as the other.
Next, I checked directive enforcement rates in adjudication involving all other
types of laws (Table B2b). The elimination of law-of-transposition cases from both
dockets appeared to strengthen the case for convergence between the two Courts. In
Cassation, the RATE OF DIRECTIVE ENFORCEMENT was about 96 percent (255 cases),
which, compared to the 97 percent (370 cases) rate observed in the Council of State,
105

See 1958 CONST., art. 39 and BROWN & BELL, supra note 102 at 61-62.

106

I say "tends to" because the government can still submit a bill that does not conform to
"the modifications suggested by the Conseil d'Etat." Id. at 61.
107

Note that the decrease in the number of transposing laws likely to be adjudicated before
the Council of State says nothing about the strength of as-applied challenges to the promulgated
versions of such laws. I discuss the broader case selection issue in the next subsection.
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would suggest that the latter Court is slightly more likely to enforce directives in such
cases. However, a p value of .666 (two-tailed) shows that the effect of ADJUDICATING
COURT on RATE OF DIRECTIVE ENFORCEMENT is but the result of random chance and,
thus, cannot be corroborated. This result, again, shows that the Courts have converging
high rates of directive enforcement, despite adhering to different theories of EU law
supremacy. More broadly, differences in the volume and types of laws they review are
not significant barriers to comparing how they adjudicate cases.
3.

Case Selection

Because, under the conventional view, the Council of State is perceived as less
deferential to EU law, one may question whether private parties file challenges only
when EU directives clearly trump national law, thus accounting for the Council of State's
high enforcement rate. Indeed, if fewer challenges to national laws mean only stronger
cases are being pursued at the Council of State, the lack of difference in the RATE OF
DIRECTIVE ENFORCEMENT between the two High Courts could be a result of case
selection,108 rather than an indication of similar deference to EU law. Arguments for the
existence of a selection effect in the context of Council of State review fail for at least
two reasons. First, Council of State adjudication is only concerned with cases involving
individual or collective organizations resisting some kind of administrative action. The
perception of less deference to EU law alone is unlikely to keep these litigants from
seeking redress through the administrative courts when they know they are not likely to
get any meaningful relief unless they sue.109 Simply put, the existence of "might have
been" plaintiffs is inconsequential in this context. Second, private litigants realize that
having the Council of State hear their conformity challenges places them in very
favorable position since, pursuant to Treaty of Rome article 234, national courts of last
resort are required to refer nontrivial questions regarding EU law interpretation to the
ECJ. This implies that, by the time Council of State review occurs, every strong (i.e.,
trivial) case for either type of litigant has already been disposed of, meaning that, if
anything, Council of State review is much more likely to involve "harder" cases, the
opposite of case selection. Thus, the conventional view is not likely affecting litigants'
decisions to file conformity challenges in the administrative courts or appeals to the
Council of State.
C.

Reconciling the Reality and Perception of EU-Conformity Review

108

See George L. Priest & Benjamin Klein, The Selection of Disputes for Litigation, 13 J.
LEGAL STUD. 1, 18 (1984).
109

In stark contrast to administrative adjudication, the state may appear before Cassation in a
different posture. In civil cases, it often appears as a common tort litigant, i.e., as a sujet des
droits, as if it were a private party having no general claim to sovereign immunity (unlike the
state under the U.S. common law system). See Stanwood R. Duval, Sovereign Immunity,
Anachronistic or Inherent: A Sword or a Shield, 84 TUL. L. REV. 1471, 1476-77 (2010).
However, selection is also unlikely in Cassation's civil cases, where there are alternative means of
relief other than litigation, because stronger cases are more likely to be settled or dismissed
earlier, leaving only the "harder" cases to final adjudication. Obviously, selection does not occur
if private litigants perceive Cassation as a more EU-deferential Court.
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Without question, Cassation's Vabre (1975) and Council of State's Nicolo (1989)
announced not only that French "judicial" Courts would review French statutes for
conformity with EU law, but created, based on each Court's different justification for
doing so (see Part III.A & B), the perception that one (Cassation) would be more
deferential to the EU legal order than the other (Council of State). At first look, the
formation of such a perception in the past appears reasonable. Indeed, expressly
accepting enforcement of EU law as concurrent authority and as soon as the opportunity
presented itself (Cassation) is quite different from doing so 15 years later, and only as a
matter of national constitutional law (Council of State).
Yet, Cassation's early advance into conformity review occurred largely because
most of its docket involves civil and commercial litigation (about 70 percent),110 making
it less likely to implicate, and thus potentially displace, major public policy choices
embedded in domestic mandatory law (droit public), the domain of Council of State
adjudication. Certainly, legislative sovereignty had a different weight to the two Courts.
Moreover, as far as conformity is concerned, the Council of State remained a player on
EU law conformity discussions even during the 1975-89 period, when, in its consultative
capacity, it could affect the lawmaking process. Still, these differences merely explain
why the Council of State waited 15 years longer than Cassation. They cannot explain
why or how, once embracing conformity review, even if under a different theory of EU
law supremacy, the Council of State, in its judicial capacity, would behave any different
than Cassation. After all, once they accepted to conduct conformity review, they both
had to act as courts of law in the task of ensuring conformity, which, by its name,
mandates deference to supranational law. Thus, whether the Treaty of Rome had created
a "separate legal order" having concurrent authority (Vabre) or controlled only by virtue
of article 55's treaty supremacy clause (Nicolo), EU directives were to be enforced,
period. That the evidence of convergence demonstrates that Cassation and the Council of
State have acted alike, despite their different foundational views, should not be a surprise.
Rather, the lack of empirical studies on conformity and the literature's focus on the few
instances of non-enforcement111 might explain the persistence of anecdotal perceptions.
1.

What Can and Cannot Be Learned from Each Court's Record
of ECJ Referrals

An alternative, more straight-forward way of detecting differences in the way the
two Courts approach EU law might be to check whether they differ in their compliance to
article 234's (Treaty of Rome) obligation to refer EU law questions to the ECJ. Clearly,
if one Court uses the referral procedure much more often than the other, one could
surmise that it does so because it is more willing to perform the role of ordinary judge of
Communitarian law than the other. Arguably, more frequent referrals by one Court
would imply that its judges are not only more willing to apply but are also more
concerned with uniform application of EU law than judges in the other. Such deference
is normally what one would expect from ordinary judges of Communitarian law vis-à-vis
their supreme court, the ECJ.
110

See discussion in Part V.B1 and note 95 supra.

111

Table C1a provides a list detailing the stated reasons for non-enforcement in conformity
adjudication before both Courts.
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To contextualize this comparison, however, one needs to understand how French
courts compare with courts of other EU members. Despite a late start in conformity
review by the Council of State, among all EU members, France ranks third (755 referrals)
in the cumulative number of referrals (i.e., 1952-2008) to the ECJ. Only Germany (1672
referrals) and Italy (978 referrals) rank higher.112 Counting solely referrals by the two
Courts (lower courts can also refer questions under article 234), Cassation, with a 15-year
head start, has referred questions 83 times while the Council of State has done so on 42
occasions. However, if one takes 1989 as the base year, the total number of referrals up
to 2008 is 46 for Cassation and, obviously, 42 for the Council of State.113 The numbers
are again very similar, but, of course, not all these referrals presented questions regarding
secondary EU law, the focus of this study.
While coding for "directive cases" in the French High Courts, I also took note of
their respective number of referrals. Due to the Constitutional Council's extremely brief
deliberation period (30 days), they obviously cannot wait for an ECJ answer, so they have
referred no questions. Conversely, Cassation and the Council of State, as ordinary
Community law courts, do not operate under such constraints and have referred 14 and
12 questions regarding the interpretation of directives to the ECJ, respectively. Figure I
reveals an alternating, yet balanced, pattern of referrals during the period of study.
FIGURE I: CASSATION AND COUNCIL OF STATE'S ECJ REFERRALS IN DIRECTIVE CASES
(BIANNUALLY)

Once more, the data demonstrate great convergence among the two Courts. Not
only are Cassation and Council of State close in their absolute number of referrals in
directive cases, their relative percentages of directive-case referrals as a proportion of
112

See COURT OF JUSTICE OF THE EUROPEAN UNION, ANNUAL REPORT (2008) 104-05.

113

Compare id. at 104 with SYNOPSIS OF THE WORK OF THE COURT OF JUSTICE AND THE
COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES IN 1988 AND 1989 AND FORMAL
SITTINGS IN 1988 AND 1989, 41 (1990).
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total referrals are also nearly identical, at 30 percent and 29 percent, respectively. A
difference-of-proportions test demonstrates that this difference is not statistically
significant (calculated p value of .89 > .05 (two-tailed)).
Next, I investigated whether the Courts differed in the way they referred cases to
the ECJ. Specifically, I looked at how often litigants and Courts, sua sponte, had been
the original sponsor of referrals (see Table C1b). Plausibly, a greater frequency of sua
sponte referrals might demonstrate a greater willingness to engage with the ECJ, thus
revealing a stronger recognition of the latter's supremacy in declaring EU law. Although
the small number of referral cases invites caution when considering these results, I found
that, contrary to the conventional wisdom, the Council of State had a greater proportion
of sua sponte referrals (67 percent or 8 cases) than Cassation (29 percent or 4 cases).
However, this difference is not statistically significant (p value approximately .113, twotailed), indicating that the Council of State is not more likely to refer, on its own volition,
a directive case to the ECJ than Cassation.
Finally, I looked solely at litigant-initiated requests for ECJ referrals to investigate
whether the Courts differed in their reactions to such requests (see Table C1c). Similar to
the argument made in the previous paragraph, a Court's greater receptiveness to referral
requests may well reveal its greater willingness to accept ECJ's input, an implicit
recognition of the latter's role in spelling out supreme EU law. While the need for
caution with the small numbers here still applies, I found that Cassation granted referral
requests more than twice as often as the Council of State (69 percent compared to 33
percent, respectively). This difference, however, was not statistically significant (p value
approximately .193, two-tailed), an indication that Cassation is no more receptive to this
type of request than the Council of State. In sum, while in raw numbers, the Council of
State seems more likely to refer cases on its own volition than Cassation, with the latter
Court, in turn, being more likely to grant such requests when instigated by parties in
litigation, neither of these relationships are statistically significant. On balance, these
differences as to how referrals are channeled through to the ECJ are statistically
meaningless and, even if significant, would at most offset each other. Thus, the data on
referrals reveals what other tests in this study have already shown: the impossibility of
distinguishing these Courts in their roles as ordinary courts of Communitarian law.
2.

A Look at the Forest: Convergence in Annual Enforcement
Rates

After determining these Courts share high cumulative rates of directive
enforcement—and even similar patterns of ECJ referrals—I examined whether their
respective rates fluctuated over time (i.e., 1989-2008). Indeed, the use of percentages
based on aggregate data could hide periods of wide fluctuation in the treatment of
directive cases between the two Courts. Conversely, narrow fluctuations would tend to
indicate uniform application of Communitarian law by France's bifurcated judiciary.
Table II shows that, throughout the period of study, the Courts have steadily achieved
high rates of directive enforcement, with the last seven-year period showing a slight
downward trend in their enforcement rates. The division of the study into three roughly
identical periods (of 7, 6 and 7 years) is, however, arbitrary and can be a bit deceptive
since it ignores year-to-year fluctuations that, while not disrupting general trends, would
require some explanation.
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TABLE II: CASSATION AND COUNCIL OF STATE RATES OF
DIRECTIVE ENFORCEMENT IN THREE PERIODS
1989 -1995

1996 - 2001

2002 - 2008

Cassation

98%
(57)

100%
(199)

92%
(165)

Council of State

100%
(46)

97%
(186)

95%
(189)

Court

Note: Number in Parentheses corresponds to total number of cases, excluding out-ofscope dismissals.114

To monitor eventual fluctuations and possibly identify their reasons, Figure II
breaks down, biannually, the Courts' enforcement rates (excluding out-of-scope
dismissals). A caveat is in order: one should approach year-to-year fluctuations in the
enforcement rate with a bit of care for such fluctuations might be themselves the result of
another spurious fluctuation: the much lower number of cases considered in a given year.
With this caveat in mind, the first two years show an initial separation between
Cassation's (90 percent) and Council of State's (100 percent) enforcement rates. This
divergence, however, is nothing but the result of a single non-enforcement decision by
Cassation in 1989, a year in which it considered but one directive case.115 A period of
converging, high enforcement rates then ensued and lasted until the end of 2000.
FIGURE II: CASSATION AND COUNCIL OF STATE RATES OF DIRECTIVE ENFORCEMENT
(BIANNUALLY)

114

I excluded out-of-scope dismissals from the pool of directive cases due to the Council of
State's more restrictive approach to the scope of administrative review. See discussion in Part
V.B.1.b.ii.
115

See Cour de cassation Chambre commercial et financière [Cass. com.] Apr. 25, 1989 Bull.
civ., No. 626 (Robert Willot Co., LLC v. Director General of Taxes) (rejecting appeal on grounds
that plaintiff's directive argument had been raised in an untimely fashion).
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Council of State enforcement rates would drop to 83 percent in 2001 (10 of 12
cases) and 80 percent in 2002 (8 of 10 cases), while Cassation rates remained at 100
percent during the same period. The Council of State justified two of these nonenforcement decisions on seemingly appropriate grounds: political question116 and prior
tacit approval by EU officials of the French national measure at issue.117 Yet, strikingly,
on the other two decisions,118 the administrative Court ruled against enforcement on
grounds that the directive in question had not yet been transposed into a French national
measure. Certainly, conditioning application of a directive on its domestic transposition
constitutes a denial of EU law supremacy and direct effect.119 Arguably, although
reliance on this particular non-enforcement ground has occurred only four times (see
Table C1a)120 in 422 rulings (see Table B1b), this might explain the persistence of the
perception that the Council of State is less likely to enforce directives, thus distorting its
overwhelming record of faithfully applying Communitarian law.121
Following this brief divergence, Council of State and Cassation directive
enforcement rates enter another period of convergence that lasts through 2007. Suddenly,
Cassation's rate drops from 95 percent at the end of 2007 (19 of 20 cases) to 76 percent
(16 of 21 cases) in 2008 (this drop, alone, explains the drop in the biannual period). In a
set of actions for restitution of unduly paid taxes, plaintiffs argued that a provision of the
French tax code (article 406 A of the Code général des impôts) violated certain EU
directives (No. 1992/12/CE, Feb. 1992 and 1992/83/CE, Oct. 19, 1992) that exempted
their productive activities from taxation.122 They alleged the State's failure to timely
116

Conseil d'Etat [CE] [Council of State] May 11, 2001 Rec. Lebon (L'Association pour le
Respect du Site du Mont-Blanc).
117

Conseil d'Etat [CE] [Council of State] Oct. 11, 2001 Rec. Lebon (France Nature
Environment).
118

Conseil d'Etat [CE] [Council of State] Jun. 14, 2002, Rec. Lebon. ( L'Association pour la
Protection de L'Environnement du Val de Copponex); and Conseil d'Etat [CE] [Council of State]
Dec. 30, 2002 (La Federation Nationale Des Transports Force Ouvriere UNCP).
119

See Costa 1964 E.C.R. 585; Van Duyn 1974 E.C.R. 1337; Simmenthal II 1978 E.C.R. 629.

120

See CE Jun. 14, 2002( L'Association pour la Protection de L'Environnement du Val de
Copponex); CE Dec. 30, 2002 (La Federation Nationale Des Transports Force Ouvriere UNCP);
Conseil d'Etat [CE] [Council of State] Apr. 07, 2006 Rec. Lebon (Societe Phytoservice); and
Conseil d'Etat [CE] [Council of State] Nov. 05, 2003 Rec. Lebon (le Syndicat de Defense de
Promotion des Fabricants et Affineurs du Morbier).
121

Indeed, another empirical study has stated that individuals "tend to overestimate the
frequency of memorable . . . events" and they may persist in "incorrect judgments in the face of
inconsistent new information." Theodore Eisenberg & Stewart Schwab, The Reality of
Consitutional Tort Litigation, 72 Cornell L. Rev. 641, 694 n. 217 (1987) (citation omitted).
122

Cour de cassation Chambre commercial et financière [Cass. com.] Jul. 08, 2008 Bull. civ.
No. 839 (Boiron Co. v. Director General of Customs & Interregional Director of Customs for
Rhone-Alpes-Auvergne); Cour de cassation Chambre commercial et financière [Cass. com.] Jul.
08, 2008 Bull. civ. No. 838 (Director General of Customs & Regional Director of Customs for
Picardie v. Yves-Saint-Laurent Parfums Lassigny); Cour de cassation Chambre commercial et
financière [Cass. com.] Jul. 08, 2008 Bull. civ. No. 837 (Boiron Co. v. Director General of
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implement the directive had forced them to pay the undue tax for which they sought
restitution. Without examining the merits, Cassation rejected these five appeals on
grounds that this was a matter for the administrative courts, not the judicial courts, and
thus did not enforce the directive as requested. However, in refusing to enforce,
Cassation did not assume a position of antagonism regarding EU law supremacy. It
merely paid deference to the distribution of judicial business in France, which reserves
"to the competence of the administrative courts the quashing or rectification of decisions
. . . by authorities exercising executive power . . .."123
The preceding empirical and qualitative analysis shows that one can still make
sense of longstanding perceptions of Cassation's and Council of State's relationship with
EU law while refuting anecdotal impressions that such differing perceptions actually
produce substantial differences in these Courts' decisions. Despite their different views
on the relationship between EU law and national law, the data show that, during the
period of study, they have acted as bona fide Communitarian law judges, enforcing
directives at an overwhelmingly high rate, and referring questions pertaining to the
interpretation of directives to the ECJ with similar enthusiasm. This does not mean that
the two Courts' views have completely merged, however. Following the fault lines of the
French bifurcated judiciary, the Courts will occasionally respond differently to the
external influence of EU law. However, it is crucial to understand that occasional
different responses are not necessarily reactions to or against EU law, but the result of a
much more complex dynamic.
Conclusion
Conformity (and conventional) review emerged in France as a solution to a
profound impasse: ensuring compliance of national measures to France's growing
international obligations—a constitutional requirement—while holding on to the notion
that legislated law could not be called into question—a historical, political, even
metaconstitutional principle. France's complex system of constitutional, judicial, and
administrative "courts" gradually overcame this impasse in creative and different ways,
often prodded by changes in the national and supranational legal landscape. In this process,
the French High Courts took their cues from each other and from their supranational
counterparts, participating in what came to be characterized as a dialogue des juges. This
article investigated a number of contexts in which this judicial dialogue has taken place and
demonstrated that Cassation and the Council of State, the two supreme courts that held the
monopoly of as-applied review until quite recently, flourished as Communitarian law
judges once they embraced conformity review.

Customs, Judicial Agent of Tresor); Cour de cassation Chambre commercial et financière [Cass.
com.] Jul. 08, 2008 Bull. civ. No. 842 (Diffusion of Perfume Products v. Director General of
Customs, Interregional Director of Customs for Rouen); Cour de cassation Chambre commercial
et financière [Cass. com.] Oct. 07, 2008 Bull. civ. No. 976(Yves Rocher Biology Labs v. Regional
Director of Customs and British Indirects).
123

Loi transférant à la juridiction judiciaire le contentieux des décisions du Conseil de la
concurrence, 1986-224 (Jan. 23, 1987) (considérant 15).
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Not unlike the incremental, treaty-based approach to the creation of the Union, this
process of judicial bricolage had unintended consequences. The most profound of these
was the de facto death of legislative supremacy, as Cassation and the Council of State
enforced directives, at times displacing non-conforming national statutes, an impossibility
under France's Constitution. Due to a growing number of Cassation and Council of State
referrals to the ECJ, the fate of French statutes, some involving constitutional-order
questions, has been increasingly determined in terms of EU law in Luxembourg. While
both the creation of as-applied constitutional review (July 2008) and the Constitutional
Council's announcement of its first such decisions (May 2010) have "creat[ed] a link
between the Council and the citizen,"124 they can also be perceived as France's attempt at
monopolizing the determination of constitutional-order questions. This shift, besides
finally sealing the fate of legislative supremacy in France, is but the latest in a series of
moves by national courts to "catch up" with the pace of European developments and the
advance of the supranational courts.
Yet, this re-launch of constitutional review as a parallel review system will
introduce a number of challenging "Erie-like" questions that will occupy the minds of
French High Court Justices for years to come.125 For instance, what happens when, in a
challenge against national law, litigants call for invalidation simultaneously on "serious"
constitutional (article 61-1) and Communitarian (Treaty of Rome, article 234) law grounds?
Should Cassation and Council of State Justices refer questions to the Constitutional Council
and ECJ simultaneously? What to do if the answers are inconsistent? Furthermore, should
the Constitutional Council, in its role as guardian of the constitutional obligation to
transpose (see Part V.C), refrain from reviewing the constitutionality of a law of
transposition that merely gives direct effect to a directive and thus defer to the ECJ
referral? Clearly, the side-by-side operation of as-applied review and the largely
overlapping conformity review system will likely increase jurisdictional disputes, as all
French High Courts play the dual role of national and Communitarian law judges.
Ultimately, their decision on these choice-of-law issues will affect not only the rate of
directive enforcement but how European judicial integration occurs in the years to come.

124

See Debré, supra note 34 at 19.

125

Procedurally, the Council's ex post constitutional review of parliamentary acts takes the
form of answers to preliminary questions (questions prioritaires) involving constitutional issues
in concrete cases pending before the French judiciary. Constitutional Law no. 2008-724 of July
23, 2008 Modernizing the Institutions of the Fifth Republic, article 29 (providing the new text of
article 61 of the French Constitution). The amended Article 61 does increase the jurisdiction of
the French constitutional court beyond abstract review into concrete, "as-applied" review, but it
also gives Cassation and the Council of State the important authority to decide which cases are
worthy of referral. See 1958 CONST., art. 61-1 (as amended).
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APPENDIX
French High Courts' Treatment of Directives under EU Conformity Review
I.

Introduction and Methodology

This appendix presents results in two formats: (a) tables containing observed data,
and (b) inferential statistical analysis. As far as the body of this article is concerned,
tables are interpreted or read row-by-row from left to right. Thus, as I allow the
independent variable to vary (e.g., Court in Table A), I can detect whether and how the
dependent variable categories, displayed in each row, change based on their observed
frequencies. Of course, to make the information in each cell comparable, each cell's
absolute frequency is normalized by dividing it by its column total.
TABLE A: CONFORMITY REVIEW: FRENCH NATIONAL LAWS VS. EU DIRECTIVES
(INCLUDING OUT-OF-SCOPE CASES)
Court
Cassation
Council of State
Total
Treatment
of EU
Directives

Directive
Enforced

407

88.10%

407

87.53%

814

Directive Not
Enforced

55

11.90%

58

12.47%

113

Total

462

465

n = 927

This is, however, a non-statistical method of evaluating the merits of research
hypotheses. Given the format in which my data is organized, I use Fisher's Exact Test to
determine the existence of a relationship between the dependent and independent
variables.126 This test also compares data from two dichotomous groups—Cassation and
Council of State—to see whether their different impact on the two categories of the
dependent variable is statistically significant. Once I calculate a p value, I compare it
with the level of statistical significance, which is 0.05 in this study (two-tailed). If the
calculated p value is less than this predetermined level, the null hypothesis is refuted and
the research hypothesis is corroborated. The following table summarizes these steps.

126

Because this test has no formal test statistic or critical value, I derive my conclusions on
statistical significance by comparing calculated probability values, not by comparing calculated
and critical values. This test has the added advantage of giving exact rather than approximate p
values.
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FISHER'S EXACT TEST CALCULATION FOR TABLE A
Observed
Frequencies
407
407
55
58

Associated p value
Pk + Pk+1 + Pk+2 . . . = 0.841

>

0.05
(Level of statistical
significance)

Because the calculated p value (0.841) is greater than the prespecified level of statistical
significance, I cannot reject the null hypothesis of no relationship. This means that
varying the Court has no effect on the treatment of directives.
In cases where I confirm the null, I conduct a post-hoc power analysis to assess
whether Fisher's had a fair chance of rejecting the null. I use a 10 percentage point
difference as the effect size, meaning that, given these populations (I am not using
samples), I would have a chance of not less than (1-β) of detecting a 10 percentage point
difference between one of the observed proportions and a theoretical proportion assumed
to be 10 percentage points smaller.127 The following table summarizes the power test
(two-tailed, α = 0.05).
POST-HOC POWER TEST CALCULATION FOR TABLE A
Input

Output

Observed Proportion = 0.8810

Power (1-β) = 0.9822

Theoretical Proportion = 0.7810

Actual α = 0.04568

Populations 1 & 2 = (462, 465)
These results show that, given these population sizes, I have about a 98 percent chance of
detecting a difference of 10 or more percentage points in these Courts' rates of directive
enforcement. Excepting Table C1a, which has more than four cells, and Table B1a,
which refutes the null hypothesis, the remaining tables underwent a similar analysis.

127

See generally Franz Faul et al., Statistical Power Analyses Using G*Power 3.1: Tests for
Correlation and Regression Analyses, 41 BEHAV. RES. METHODS 1149 (2009).
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Results and Statistical Comparison for Remaining Tables in Text
TABLE B1a: PRIVATE PARTY VS. GOVERNMENT CONFORMITY LITIGATION
(INCLUDING OUT-OF-SCOPE CASES)
Court
Cassation

Treatment
of EU
Directives

Directive
Enforced

277

Directive Not
Enforced

16

Total

293

Council of State

Total

94.54%

407

87.53%

684

5.46%

58

12.47%

74

465

n = 758

FISCHER'S EXACT TEST CALCULATION FOR TABLE B1a
Observed
Frequencies
277
407
16
58

Associated p value
Pk + Pk+1 + Pk+2 . . . = 0.002
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<

0.05
(Level of statistical
significance)
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TABLE B1b: PRIVATE PARTY VS. GOVERNMENT CONFORMITY LITIGATION
(EXCLUDING OUT-OF-SCOPE CASES)
Court
Cassation
Treatment
of EU
Directives

Directive
Enforced

277

Directive Not
Enforced

9

Total

286

Council of State

96.85%

3.15%

Total

407

96.45%

684

15

03.55%

24

422

n = 708

FISCHER'S EXACT TEST CALCULATION FOR TABLE B1b
Observed
Frequencies
277
407
16
58

Associated p value
Pk + Pk+1 + Pk+2 . . . = 0.835

>

0.05
(Level of statistical
significance)

POST-HOC POWER TEST CALCULATION FOR TABLE B1b
Input

Output

Observed Proportion = 0.9685

Power (1-β) = 0.9988

Theoretical Proportion = 0.8685

Actual α = 0.0440

Populations 1 & 2 = (286, 422)
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TABLE B2a: LAWS OF TRANSPOSITION AND DIRECTIVE ENFORCEMENT
(EXCLUDING OUT-OF-SCOPE CASES)
Court
Cassation
Treatment
of EU
Directive

Directive
Enforced

152

Directive Not
Enforced

4

Council of State
97.44%

02.56%

156

Total

Total

37

92.50%

189

3

07.50%

7

40

n = 196

FISCHER'S EXACT TEST CALCULATION FOR TABLE B2a
Observed
Frequencies
152
37
4
3

Associated p value
Pk + Pk+1 + Pk+2 . . . = 0.152

>

0.05
(Level of statistical
significance)

POST-HOC POWER TEST CALCULATION FOR TABLE B2a
Input

Output

Observed Proportion = 0.9744

Power (1-β) = 0.6436

Theoretical Proportion = 0.8744

Actual α = 0.0350

Populations 1 & 2 = (156, 40)
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TABLE B2b: LAWS NOT OF TRANSPOSITION AND DIRECTIVE ENFORCEMENT
(EXCLUDING OUT-OF-SCOPE CASES)
Court
Cassation

Treatment
of EU
Directive

Council of State

Total

Directive
Enforced

255

96.23%

370

96.86%

625

Directive Not
Enforced

10

03.77%

12

03.14%

22

265

Total

382

n = 647

FISCHER'S EXACT TEST CALCULATION FOR TABLE B2b
Observed
Frequencies
255
370
10
12

Associated p value
Pk + Pk+1 + Pk+2 . . . = 0.666

>

0.05
(Level of statistical
significance)

POST-HOC POWER TEST CALCULATION FOR TABLE B2b
Input

Output

Observed Proportion = 0.9623

Power (1-β) = 0.9950

Theoretical Proportion = 0.8623

Actual α = 0.0435

Populations 1 & 2 = (265, 382)
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TABLE C1a: NON-ENFORCEMENT CASES
Court
Cassation

Council of State

Total

Directive Out of
Stated
Scope
Reasons for
NonAvoiding
enforcement Retroactivity

41

74.55%

43

74.14%

84

10.91%

1

01.72%

Directive Not
Yet Transposed

0

0.00%

4

06.90%

4

Directive Struck
Down by ECJ

2

03.64%

0

0.00%

2

Procedural
Impediments

6

10.91%

7

12.07%

13

0

0.00%

2

03.45%

2

1

01.72%

1

Law of
Transposition
Not Yet
Enforceable
Tacit
Endorsement of
National Law
by EU Officials

Total

6

0

0.00%

55
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TABLE C1b: SOURCE OF REFERRALS TO ECJ
Court

Source

Cassation

Council of State

Total

Litigant
Request

10

4

33.33%

14

Sua Sponte

4

8

66.67%

12

Total

14

71.43%

28.57%

12

n = 26

FISCHER'S EXACT TEST CALCULATION FOR TABLE C1b
Observed
Frequencies
10
4
4
8

Associated p value
Pk + Pk+1 + Pk+2 . . . = 0.113

>

0.05
(Level of statistical
significance)

POST-HOC POWER TEST CALCULATION FOR TABLE C1b
Input

Output

Observed Proportion = 0.7143

Power (1-β) = 0.0554

Theoretical Proportion = 0.6143

Actual α = 0.0300

Populations 1 & 2 = (14, 12)
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TABLE C1c: REFERRED REQUESTS AND DENIALS
Court

Litigant
Requests

Cassation

Council of State

Total

10

4

14

Granted
Denied

12

Total

69.23%

30.77%

13

22

33.33%

66.67%

17

25
n = 39

FISCHER'S EXACT TEST CALCULATION FOR TABLE C1c
Observed
Frequencies
10
4
12
13

Associated p value
Pk + Pk+1 + Pk+2 . . . = 0.193

>

0.05
(Level of statistical
significance)

POST-HOC POWER TEST CALCULATION FOR TABLE C1c
Input

Output

Observed Proportion = 0.6923

Power (1-β) = 0.0735

Theoretical Proportion = 0.5923

Actual α = 0.0348

Populations 1 & 2 = (22, 17)
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